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SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRIOR TO CLASS CERTIFICATION
Linda S. Mullenix
After granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
therefore, and since (as was predictable, given the district judge’s
ground) no one stepped forward to pick up the spear dropped by the
named plaintiffs, the judge denied the motion for class certification.1
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the swamp of summary judgment literature,2 academics,3
commentators,4 treatise-writers,5 empiricists,6 and practitioners7 pay
scant attention to the role of summary judgment in class action litigation,
prior to class certification.8 This lacuna is perhaps justified by the
2. There is a sizeable body of summary judgment scholarship; much of it generated after the
Supreme Court‘s 1986 ―trilogy‖ of cases on summary judgment standards. See infra note 10. For a
collection of academic and empirical scholarship relating to summary judgment prior to the Court‘s
trilogy, see Joe Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich, and David Rindskopf, A Quarter-Century of
Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 861,
865 n.10 (2007).
3. See, e.g., John Bronstein, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522
(2007); Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases:
Drifting Towards Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591 (2004); Edward
Brunet, Summary Judgment is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1625 (2008); Martin H. Redish,
Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1329 (2005); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and
Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705 (2007); Adam N. Steinman, An Ounce of
Prevention: Solving Some Unforeseen Problems With the Proposed Amendments to Rule 56 and the
Summary Judgment Practice, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 230 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary
Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007).
4. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, The Story of Celotex: The Role of Summary Judgment in the
Administration of Civil, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 343-70 (Kevin M. Clermont, ed. 2004);
Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (1998).
5. EDWARD BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND
PRACTICE (3d ed. 2009).
6. See Joe Cecil and George Cort, Memorandum, Report on Summary Judgment Practice
Across Districts with Variations in Local Rules (Federal Judicial Center, Aug. 13, 2009); Joe Cecil
and George Cort, Memorandum, Supplemental Analyses of Summary Judgment Local Rules
Practices (Federal Judicial Center May 30, 2009); Joe Cecil and George Cort, Memorandum,
Report on Summary Judgment Practice Across Districts with Variations in Local Rules (Federal
Judicial Center April 2, 2008); Cecil, Eyre, & Miletich, supra note 2, at 861.; Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca
N. Eyre, Dean Miletich, and David Rindskopf, Trends in Summary Judgment Practice: 1975-2000
(Federal Judicial Center 2007); Joe Cecil and George Cort, Memorandum, Estimates of Summary
Judgment Activity in Fiscal Year 2006 (Federal Judicial Center June 15, 2007); and Joe Cecil and
George Cort, Memorandum, Initial Report on Summary Judgment Practice Across Districts with
Variations in Local Rules (Federal Judicial Center Nov. 2, 2007).
7. See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Through the Prism: Summary Judgment After the Trilogy,
American Law Institute-American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education ALI-ABA Course
of Study (July 2007).
8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) (directing courts to determine at ―an early practicable time‖
whether a proposed class action may be maintained as a class action. See also MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION FOURTH at § 21.133 (Federal Judicial Center 2004) (timing of the
certification decision and pre-certification threshold dispositive motions); Thomas E. Willging,
Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District
Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 29-33 (Federal Judicial Center
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corresponding scant attention paid by courts―in reported decisions, at
least9―to summary judgment prior to class certification. This is
unfortunate.
This brief article makes the case for enhanced judicial scrutiny of
summary judgment motions prior to the class certification decision.
This argument is congruent (and convergent) with the Supreme Court‘s
summary judgment trilogy,10 the Court‘s twin pleading decisions in
Twombly11 and Iqbal,12 the Third Circuit‘s decision in Hydrogen
Peroxide,13 and the suggestions from various quarters that courts ought

1996) (rate of pre-certification rulings on motions to dismiss was approximately 80 percent in three
of four districts studied and about 60 percent in other districts; approximately three out of ten cases
were terminated as a result of a summary judgment motion). The findings of this study are
discussed at greater length, infra note 22.
It is, of course, possible to move for summary judgment after class certification, and many of
the reported decisions dealing with summary judgment and class actions occur in this posture. This
article does not address the issues relating to summary judgment after class certification. See
discussion infra Part I, concerning the strategic decision to seek summary judgment prior to or after
class certification.
9. As Professor Stephen Burbank correctly points out—a view this author completely
endorses―it is inherently misleading to venture broad theories about summary judgment practice
based on reported courts decisions, because reported decisions do not provide a reliable means for
assessing actual summary judgment practice in the courts. See Burbank, supra note 3, at 604. See
also Cecil, Eyre, & Miletich, A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice, supra note 2, at
869-67 (commenting on the same problems of empirical research concerning summary judgment
based on reported decisions, and surveying problematic studies). See infra notes 54-62 (citing cases
in which courts have granted pre-certification summary judgment motions, and reasons in support
of summary judgment practice before ruling on the class certification motion).
10. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (clarifying the shifting allocations of
burdens of production, persuasion, and proof at summary judgment); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986) (applying heightened evidentiary standard of proof in libel action
to judicial assessment of propriety of summary judgment); Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (holding antitrust plaintiff with an inherently implausible claim
was subject to dismissal at summary judgment). For assessments of the summary judgment trilogy,
see Marcy J. Levine, Comment, Summary Judgment: The Majority View Undergoes a Complete
Reversal in the 1996 Supreme Court, 37 EMORY L. J. 171 (1988); John E. Kennedy, Federal
Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and Evidentiary
Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REV. OF LITIG. 227 (1987).
11. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See generally Robert G. Bone,
Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009);
Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063 (2009); Kendall W. Hannon,
Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study of the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on Rule
12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility
Pleading, 49 B.C.L. REV. 431 (2008).
12. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
13. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307-09 (3d Cir. 2008) (clarifying
the requirements of the ―rigorous analysis‖ standard for class certification; requiring that class
proponents prove class certification requirements by a preponderance of the evidence and that
courts resolve all disputed issues of fact in order to certify a class). The Third Circuit‘s Hydrogen
Peroxide decision joins a series of similar appellate decisions requiring heightened certification
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to evaluate the merits of proposed class actions during the class
certification process.14 Summary judgment prior to class certification,
then, is a logical―and desirable―extension of these trends.
This article argues that summary judgment before class certification
embodies a sensible timing accommodation between the heightened
pleading requirements of Twombly/Iqbal and the heightened class
certification requirements of Hydrogen Peroxide. The argument for a
summary judgment determination prior to class certification is based on
the fact that class certification changes the litigation dynamic, being
disconnected from the underlying merits of the dispute. The argument
for summary judgment prior to class certification is based on the simple
premise that if an individual plaintiff‘s case is so fatally defective
(factually and legally) even after discovery, then the court ought to end
the case and not permit class certification to proceed. The argument for

requirements and merits-determinations at class certification. See also Oscar Private Equity Inv. v.
Allegiance Telecomm., Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Public Offering Sec. Litig., 471
F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356 94th Cir. 2004); Szabo v.
Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001). For commentary on these appellate cases
as embodying a trend that is ―chipping away‖ at the Eisen rule, see generally Steig D. Olson,
“Chipping Away”: The Misguided Trend Towards Resolving Merit Disputes as Part of the Class
Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935 (2009).
14. See Robert G. Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits,
51 DUKE L.J. 1251 (2002) (urging abolition of the so-called ―Eisen rule‖); Roy Alan Cohen and
Thomas J. Coffey, Judicial Review of Class Certification Applications ― The Compelling Case for
a Merits-Based Gate-Keeper Analysis, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 257 (April 2009) (stating that the Second
Circuit‘s decision in Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 471 F.3d 24, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2006) provides
guide for courts to address role of merits in class certification); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class
Certification Based on Merits of the Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (arguing that consideration
should be given to procedures for determining the merits of the individual claims and the size of the
class before a suit is certified as a class suit); Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the
Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849 (2004)
(arguing in favor of a merits assessment of claims prior to judicial approval of a proposed class
action settlement); Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis
Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366 (1966) (proposing an amendment to
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) to provide for an assessment of the merits, to be included as part of the
superiority analysis of class action treatment); Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits of Class
Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51 (2004) (arguing in favor of ―weak-form‖ rules to
permit reasonable inquiries into the merits as relevant to class certification); and Douglas M.
Towns, Note, Merit-Based Class Action Certification: Old Wine in a New Bottle, 78 VA. L. REV.
1001 (1992). But cf. Olson, supra note 13, at 939:
It appears that courts driving this trend, and the commentators who encourage them, are
motivated less by concerns of judicial efficiency, doctrinal coherence, or deterrence
goals, and more by a desire to use Rule 23 to screen what are perceived to be weak cases
from strong ones. The notion that Rule 23 should involve screening cases based on
merit is a product of a belief that corporate defendants need judicial shielding from the
coercive effect the certification decision can have on a defendant. That coercion is seen
as unfair when class claims are weak.
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summary judgment prior to class certification is based on efficiency and
fairness rationales; summary adjudication before class certification
supports the goals of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of all civil actions. This is
especially compelling when confronted with a legally and factually
deficient complex litigation.
This proposal for pre-certification summary judgment adjudication
does not violate the so-called Eisen rule.15 It has nothing to do with the
Eisen rule, because the Eisen rule only comes into play at the point at
which a judge must evaluate whether to certify a proposed class action.
Pre-certification evaluation of a summary judgment motion effectively
avoids the Eisen rule by forcing a merits determination prior to class
certification, in an individual case setting. If an individual plaintiff has a
viable claim, pre-certification summary judgment adjudication will not
undermine the possibility for class litigation. On the contrary, if a
plaintiff has a fatally defective case after summary judgment discovery,
then courts ought not to sanction a plaintiff‘s advantage achieved
through class certification of an aggregation of multiple bad claims.
Moreover, if a plaintiff at summary judgment drops the spear of class
litigation and no one else rises to champion the class, then the litigation
ought to be at an end.
Historically, federal reception to summary judgment practice has
been characterized by two general trends. From 1938 through the
Supreme Court‘s 1986 trilogy, many federal judges viewed summary
judgment as a disfavored motion.16 The Court‘s 1986 trilogy of
summary judgment decisions ushered in the second modern era of
summary judgment practice.17 Numerous commentators have suggested
that the Court‘s 1986 trilogy, then, embodied a signal from the Supreme
Court to federal judges to utilize summary judgment procedure more
often as a means to respond to factually deficient cases.18
Parallel to these trends, courts historically have manifested
ambivalent views concerning the use of summary judgment in complex

15. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974).
16. See Cecil, Eyre, & Miletich, supra note 2, at 862 (―Prior to the Supreme Court‘s trilogy of
decisions in 1986, summary judgment was viewed as an underused and somewhat awkward tool
that invited judicial distrust.‖) (citing authorities).
17. ―Common perceptions regarding summary judgment have undergone a remarkable
transformation in the past two decades.‖ Id.
18. Id. (―The trilogy has been widely viewed as a turning point in the use of summary
judgment, signaling a greater emphasis on summary judgment as a necessary means to respond to
claims and defenses without sufficient factual support.‖).
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litigation.19 Prior to 1986, federal courts generally held the view that
summary judgment should be used sparingly in complex antitrust
actions,20 and it was almost a boilerplate proposition that complex cases
were not suitable for summary adjudication. As is well-known, the
Supreme Court substantially eroded this historical resistance to the use
of summary judgment to resolve complex cases in its 1986 Matsushita
decision.21
Prevailing jurisprudence has long suggested that complex cases, by
virtue of their complexity, are especially not suitable for summary
adjudication. This article argues that the case for summary judgment
prior to class certification is based on the same proposition: that complex
cases are especially suitable for summary disposition in an appropriate
case.
Convergent with heightened pleading and rigorous class
certification standards, a requirement for pre-certification summary
judgment stands the boilerplate opposition to summary judgment in
complex cases on its head. Rather than endorsing an implicit
presumption against summary judgment in complex classes, the
argument for pre-certification summary judgment is based on the
concept that complex litigation is especially suited for summary
judgment consideration.
Finally, the idea that judges ought to rule on summary judgment
motions prior to class certification is not new, and indeed, has been
urged as a possible Rule 23 amendment. More than fifteen years ago,
during the first phase of proposed amendments to Rule 23, proponents
suggested that Rule 23 be amended to require judges to consider Rule 12
and Rule 56 motions prior to class certification.22 These proposals did

19. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 5, at § 9.3.
20. Id.; see Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
21. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). See Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 475 (7th
Cir. 1988) (the 1986 trilogy makes ―clear that, contrary to the emphasis of some prior precedent, the
use of summary judgment is not only permitted but encouraged in . . . antitrust cases.‖). But cf.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (reversing grant of summary
judgment in antitrust illegal tying case; distinguishing Matsushita). Brunet and Redish indicate that
the erosion of resistance to the use of summary judgment in complex antitrust cases had been
building among federal courts for some years prior to the Court‘s Matsushita decision. See BRUNET
& REDISH, supra note 5, at § 9.5. For a lengthy analysis of the Matsushita decision, see id. at § 9.6.
22. See Willging, Hooper & Niemic, supra note 8, at Appendix A, Proposed Rule 23 – 1993,
and Appendix B, Proposed Rule 23 – 1995. The 1993 proposal would have amended Rule
23(d)(1)(B) to state:
[In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate
orders that:] (B) decide a motion under Rule 12 or 56 before the certification
determination if the court concludes that the decision will promote the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy and will not cause undue delay . . . .
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not gain traction and were abandoned, along with an array of other
proposals. Moreover, the use of enhanced summary judgment prior to
class certification also has received tacit endorsement from class action
scholars at the Rand Institute for Civil Justice23 and support from
researchers at the Federal Judicial Center.24
Much has changed in the litigation landscape in the more than
fifteen years since reformers first urged the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules to incorporate a provision that would provide explicit
authority to federal judges to rule on summary judgment motions prior
to class certification. The desirability of such a provision now has
considerable doctrinal and policy support―from the Supreme Court and
federal appellate courts―embodied in the general trends requiring
heightened pleading in complex cases and rigorous analysis of class
certification requirements.25

Id. at 94. The proposed Advisory Committee Note to this new provision provided: ―Subdivision (d).
The former rule generated uncertainty concerning the appropriate order of proceeding when a
motion addressed to the merits of claims or defenses is submitted prior to a decision on whether a
class should be certified. The revision provides the court with discretion to address a Rule 12 or
Rule 56 motion in advance of a certification decision if this will promote the fair and efficient
adjudication of a controversy. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND, § 30.11.‖ Id. at
98. This proposed addition to Rule with regard to Rule 12 and 56 motions was carried forward to
the proposed 1995 amendments. The 1995 amendments also added provisions permitting the judge
to assess the merits of claims and defenses at the time of class certification. Id. at 101-02.
23. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER, BONNIE DOMBEY-MOORE, BETH GIDDENS, JENNIFER GROSS,
ERIK K. MOLLER, AND NICHOLAS M. PACE, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS
FOR PRIVATE GAIN at 26 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice Monograph 1999):
Judge presiding over class actions should use their summary judgment and dismissal
powers, when appropriate – as many do now. Preserving the line between certification
based on the form of the litigation (e.g., numerosity, commonality, superiority) and
dismissal and summary judgment based on the substantive law and facts seems likely to
produce consistent signals to parties as to what types of cases will be certified than
conflating the two decisions.
See also Deborah R. Hensler and Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It:” Alternative
Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform at 142 n.13 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 2001)
(―Under existing rules judge can, of course, dismiss class actions for failure to state a claim or by
summary judgment.‖).
24. In commenting on the proposed 1993 and 1995 amendments to Rule 23, see supra note
22, the authors of the empirical study of four federal district courts noted: ―Having explicit authority
to so rule, however, might influence any judge who has felt constrained to avoid ruling on such
motions prior to class certification.‖ See Willging, Hooper & Neiemic, supra note 8, at 29.
25. See supra notes 10 and 13.
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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRIOR TO CLASS CERTIFICATION: STRATEGY
AND BASIC PRINCIPLES
A.

Empirical Studies of Summary Judgment Prior to Class
Certification

We do not know a great deal about summary judgment prior to
class certification, and what we do know consists of somewhat dated
empirical data.26 Although the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) has
conducted numerous empirical studies of summary judgment practice in
federal court in the post-trilogy era,27 these studies do not illuminate the
use of summary judgment in complex litigation or the subset of class
action cases.28 Rather, the FJC summary judgment studies collect data
relating to trends in summary judgment filings (and dispositions) based
on substantive categories of cases, such as contracts, civil rights, torts,
and a catch-all ―other‖ category.29 What the FJC summary judgment
studies do not inform is the percentage or rate of substantive cases
pursued as class action litigation; moreover, the FJC summary judgment
studies also do not address summary judgment disposition either prior to
class certification or after class certification.
The Federal Judicial Center has also conducted a number of studies
of class action practice in federal courts. Most recently, these studies
have focused on the impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA)30 on federal courts‘ diversity dockets.31 The first phase of the
FJC‘s long-term CAFA study examined whether CAFA has resulted in
increased original or removal class action filings in federal court.32
―Phase II of the Center‘s CAFA impact study will address the nature and
sources of underlying class claims; class discovery; remand rulings; pretrial motions practice; class certification activity; and the process of

26. The only Federal Judicial Center study to examine pre-certification dispositive motions is
the Center‘s 1996 empirical study of class action practice in four judicial districts. See Willging,
Hooper & Neiemic, supra note 22.
27. See supra note 6.
28. For a discussion of the potential use of pre-certification dispositive motions in
Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) practice, see infra pp. 52-54.
29. See, e.g., Cecil, Eyre, & Miletich, supra note 2.
30. Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
31. See Thomas E. Willging and Emery G. Lee III, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005: Third Interim Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 2
(Federal Judicial Center April 2007) (finding a 46 percent increase in class action activity from
January to June 2006; also reporting an increase in diversity removal cases to federal courts).
32. Id.
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reviewing settlements.‖33 Because this portion of the FJC impact project
is not yet completed, there is no currently available data on federal court
practice with regard to pre-certification dispositive motions.
The only extant empirical study of federal pre-certification
summary judgment motions, then, is the FJC‘s 1996 study of class
action practice in four federal district courts (the Northern District of
Illinois, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Northern District of
California, and the Southern District of Florida).34 The study examined
both pre-certification Rule 12 motions to dismiss, as well as Rule 56
summary judgment motions, and many of the Center‘s conclusions are
based on combined data for the two sets of motions.35
With regard to all types of pre-certification motions, the 1996 FJC
study concluded that approximately two out of three cases in each of the
four district courts issued rulings on a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, a Rule
56 motion for summary judgment, or a sua sponte dismissal order.36 Of
the cases in which litigants filed a motion to dismiss, courts issued
rulings in between 73 percent and 81 percent of the cases, depending on
the district.37 Obviously, this high percentage of adjudication indicates
that federal judges in these four districts were willing to issue rulings on
dispositive motions, rather than deferring such rulings.
With regard to the subset of Rule 56 motions, the FJC study
documented that the vast majority of summary judgment motions were
filed by defendants.38 Judges in two district courts issued rulings on
summary judgment approximately 85 percent of the time, and judges in
the other two districts issued rulings 60 percent of the time.39 Courts
granted motions for summary judgment in whole or in part in more than
half the rulings (54 percent to 68 percent) in three of the four districts.40
In the fourth,41 summary judgment motions were granted in whole or in
part 39 percent of the time.42

33. See Progress Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on the Impact of CAFA on
the Federal Courts 1 (Federal Judicial Center November 7, 2007).
34. Willging, Hooper & Neiemic, supra note 22.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 171, Table 24.
37. The FJC study found that this rate of ruling approximates the rate of rulings found in three
studies of motions to dismiss in general litigation. Id. at 33 n.104.
38. Id. at 33, n.105, 125 Figure 26, and 172 Table 26.
39. Id. at 33, n.106; 126 Figure 27. The study notes, with regard to summary judgment
motions: ―[the] data that are comparable to and, overall, somewhat higher than the rate of rulings in
a study of general civil litigation.‖ Id.
40. Id. at 172, Table 26.
41. The FJC study considered the Northern District of Illinois somewhat of an anomaly in the
study, because of the district court‘s jurisprudence disfavoring summary judgment motions in the
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The FJC study also found that judges generally took a longer time
to rule on motions for summary judgment than on other motions to
dismiss. The median time from the filing of the first motion for
summary judgment to the first summary judgment ruling was less than
four months in two courts, and more than seven months in the other two
courts.43 Seventy-five percent of all motions for summary judgment
were resolved in 7.9, 15.4, 16.8, and 5.2 months in the four courts.44
In assessing its findings of data on combined Rule 12 and Rule 56
motions to dismiss, the FJC broadly concluded:
On the one hand, motions to dismiss are filed and granted more
frequently in class action litigation than in ordinary civil litigation.
Such data indicate that a relatively large number of cases are found to
be without legal or factual merit, or both. Comparison with data from
a 1974 study of (b)(3) class actions indicates, however, that the rate of
dismissal and summary judgment is lower in the current study than it
was during the 1966-1972 in one federal district court.
On the other hand, defendants generally appear to have had an
opportunity to test the merits of the litigation and obtain a judicial
ruling in a reasonably timely manner, particularly for motions to
dismiss. Testing the factual sufficiency of claims via summary
judgment, however, may take more than a year for some rulings in
some courts.
For at least one-third of the cases in our study, judicial rulings on
motions terminated the litigation without a settlement, coerced or
otherwise. The settlement value of other cases was undoubtedly
influenced by rulings granting motions for partial dismissal or partial
summary judgment and by rulings denying such motions. 45

The 1996 FJC findings are notable for several reasons. First, the
1996 FJC data may prove surprising to many class action practitioners,
who anecdotally believe that judges are disinclined to rule on precertification dispositive motions, preferring instead to defer such rulings
until after class certification. The FJC data seems to disprove that
impressionistic belief. Second, the FJC data suggests that precertification motion practice (including rulings on such motions)
generally tracks the same incidence of dispositive motion practice as in
class action context. Nonetheless, the study concluded that even in light of this historical resistance
to such summary judgment motions, district judges in the Northern District of Illinois did grant
summary judgment dismissals in class action litigation.
42. Id. at 172, Table 26.
43. Id. at 173, Table 29.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 34.
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ordinary litigation. This finding may prove surprising to critics of
summary judgment, who believe that federal judges excessively use
dispositive motions to eliminate categories of cases based on the judge‘s
subjective predilections. The FJC findings seem to refute any theory or
argument that judges utilize dispositive motions or summary judgment
to excessively dismiss class action litigation.
However, the 1996 FJC findings with regard to summary judgment
practice in class action litigation must be cabined by the limitations of
that study, as well as its timeliness.46 The FJC study examined precertification motion practice in only four federal district courts,47 and at
least one of the districts the FJC identified as an outlier with regard to its
views on summary judgment.48 The database, then, was extremely
limited. In addition, the FJC data is now approximately fifteen years
old. In the interim, there has been a sea-change in pleading and motions
practice, in both ordinary and complex federal class action litigation.
Hence, Phase II of the FJC‘s CAFA impact study, which contemplates a
new empirical study of dispositive motion practice, should provide
important new data on trends in federal court against this changed
litigation landscape.49
B.

Existing Jurisprudence on Pre-Certification Summary Judgment
Practice

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is silent concerning the timing
of summary judgment motions in relation to class certification.50
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 likewise makes no reference to
summary judgment in the context of class action litigation.51 The 2003
amendments to Rule 23 changed the language concerning the timing of
class certification, instructing courts to make a class certification
determination ―at an early practicable time.‖52 The Federal Judicial
Center advises federal judges to feel free to ignore local rules calling for
specific time limits relating to the class certification determination, but

46. Id. at 4-5.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 30.
49. See Progress Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on the Impact of CAFA on
the Federal Courts 1 (Federal Judicial Center November 7, 2007).
50. Id. at 94.
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
52. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
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instead to apply the 2003 amended Rule 23(c)(1) certification timing
provision.53
Perhaps more importantly, the Federal Judicial Center now informs
federal judges that in tandem with the 2003 amended timing provision,
judges are permitted to rule on motions or to dismiss by summary
judgment before ruling on class certification.54 Indeed, the FJC instructs
that:
Given the flexibility in the rules, the most efficient practice is to rule
on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment before addressing
class certification. Ruling on class certification may prove to be
unnecessary. The most important actions you can take to promote
settlement are to rule on dispositive motions and then, if necessary,
rule on class certification.55

The Federal Judicial Center‘s current position urging federal judges
to rule on pre-certification dispositive motions diverges from the
historical position of some federal courts―most notably the Seventh
Circuit56―that interpreted the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacqueline57 to require that courts rule on class certification
before making any ruling on the merits of the case.58 This interpretation

53. See Barbara J. Rothstein, Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges
(Federal Judicial Center 2009) (―Considering this rule, you should feel free to ignore local rules
calling for specific time limits; they appear to be inconsistent with the federal rules and, as such,
obsolete‖) (citing the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH § 21.133). The 1996 FJC
empirical study of class action practice also examined the impact of local rules on the timing of
dispositive and summary judgment motions, and generally concluded that it seemed doubtful that
local rules had an effect on judge‘s rulings on pre-certification motions. See Willging, et al., supra
note 22, at 94.
For commentary on the amendment to Rule 23(c)(1) and its effect on pre-certification
dispositive motions, see BRUNET & REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT § 10:16 (3d ed. 2009); JOSEPH
M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:1 (5th ed. 2009) (timing of class action
determination – ―early practicable time‖ requirement).
54. Rothstein, supra note 53, at 8.
55. Id. at 8-9.
56. The Seventh Circuit has had a historical antipathy to granting summary judgment motions
prior to class certification motions. See, e.g., Koch v. Standard, 962 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1992)
and Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 868 F.2d 943, 947 (7th Cir. 1989). In both these cases, the
Seventh Circuit expressed its view that it is improper for a district court to delay ruling on a class
certification motion until after having decided a motion to dismiss. But cf. Cowen v. Bank United,
70 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1995) (allowing for district court discretion to decide summary judgment
motions prior to class certification).
57. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
58. See, e.g., Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F.2d 718, 723 n.9 (4th Cir. 1976) vacated,
431 U.S. 952 (1977) (quoting Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 354 (7th Cir. 1975)). See
also Willging, Hooper & Neiemic, supra note 22, at 29, 94 (discussing the divergent views of
federal courts regarding ruling on pre-certification dispositive motions).
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of Eisen, in relation to the timing of dispositive motions, was predicated
on avoiding one-way intervention or opt-out by class members who
would know the outcome on the merits in advance of class
certification.59 However, despite this theoretical Eisen doctrinal barrier,
some other federal courts historically permitted courts to rule on precertification dispositive motions, viewing such motions as a partial or
complete waiver of the protection against one-way intervention.60
Whatever may have been the historical disinclination of some
federal courts to eschew ruling on pre-certification dispositive motions,
it now seems well-established that federal courts not only have the
authority to rule on dispositive motions prior to class certification,61 but

59. Hudson v. Chicago Teachers‘ Union, 922 F.2d 1306, 1317 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 501
U.S. 1230 (1991); Peritz, 523 F.2d at 353-54; Issen v. GSC Enter., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 390, 395
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (discussing one-way intervention problem).
60. See, e.g., Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 1984) (implicit waiver where the
defendant assumes the risk of the limited effect of its summary judgment motion); Peritz 523 F.2d
at 354 n.4 (noting that defendants may waive one-way intervention protection by moving for
summary judgment prior to class certification); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 762 (3d
Cir. 1974) (en banc) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (pre-certification dispositive motion
constituted an explicit waiver of the protection against one-way intervention; use of ―test case‖ prior
to class certification ruling); Hyman v. First Union Corp., 982 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 1997)
(discussing problem of one-way intervention and defendant‘s waiver by pre-certification summary
judgment motion; concluding that defendants explicitly waived right); Issen v. GSC Enter., Inc.,
522 F. Supp. 390, 395 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (waiver of one-way intervention protection).
61. See, e.g., Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 513 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 2008); Pisciotta v. Old
Nat‘l Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007); Kehoe v. Fidelity Fed. Bank & Trust, 421 F.3d 1209,
1211 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (―[I]t is within the court‘s discretion to consider the merits of the claims
before their amenability to class certification‖); Estate of Gleiberman v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 94
Fed. Appx. 944, 948 (3d Cir. 2004) (no abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine that the
named plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted prior to determining
class certification); Curtin v. United Airlines, Inc., 275 F.3d 88, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Schweizer v.
Trans Union Corp., 136 F.3d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1998); Cowen v. Bank United of Tex., FSB, 70 F.3d
937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995) (Rule 23(c)(1) allowing for wriggle room for court to rule on precertification summary judgment motion); Thompson v. County of Medina, Ohio, 29 F.3d 238, 241
(6th Cir. 1994); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 677 n.12 (10th Cir. 1988); Floyd v. Bowen, 833
F.2d 529, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1987); Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 1536, 1552 (6th Cir. 1984); Wall
v. Leavitt, Medicare & Medicaid 302350, 2008 WL 744429 at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Villagran v.
Central Ford, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 866, 882 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (a suit pleaded as a class action may
be resolved by deciding a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment even before class
certification is decided); Encarnacion ex rel. George v. Astrue, 491 F. Supp. 2d 453, 459 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (district court may reserve decision on class certification motion pending disposition of
summary judgment motion); Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (district court may properly consider motion to dismiss prior to issue of class certification);
Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 446 (D. Me. 2005); Evans v. Taco Bell Corp., 2005 WL
2333841, *4 n.6 (D.N.H. 2005) (―It is well-settled that, absent prejudice to the plaintiff, a court may
decide a defendant‘s motion for summary judgment in a putative class action before taking up the
issue of class certification‖); Coburn v. Daimler Chrysler Serv. of North America, L.L.C., 2005 WL
736657, at *7 ((N.D. Ill. 2005) (―[P]recedent makes clear that the presence or potential presence of
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that this is a preferred case management approach.62 Moreover, the
argument that the Court‘s Eisen decision prevents a court from ruling on
a pre-certification dispositive and summary judgment motions seems
definitively to have been laid to rest:
[The plaintiff] also relies on Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin . . . in which
the Supreme Court held that it was inappropriate to make a preliminary
assessment of the merits of a case in order to determine if it could be
maintained as a class action. Eisen makes clear that the determination
of whether a class meets the requirements of Rule 23 must be
performed separately from the determination of the merits, but it does
not require the class certification to be addressed first. ―There is
nothing in Rule 23 which precludes a court from examining the merits
of plaintiff‘s claims on a proper Rule 12 motion to dismiss or Rule 56
motion for summary judgment simply because such a motion‖
precedes resolution of the issue of class certification. Lorber v. Beebe,
407 F. Supp. 279, 291 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Adames v.
Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 133 F.R.D. 82, 87 n.1 (E.D. N.Y. 1989). The
decision to award summary judgment before acting on class
certification was well within the discretion of the district court,

a class action does not alter a plaintiff‘s basic requirement of establishing all the elements of any
cause of action alleged in a complaint‖); Garcia v. Veneman, 211 F.R.D. 15, 19 n.2 (D.D.C. 2002)
(―A court may certainly decide dispositive motions prior to determining whether the case may be
maintained as a class action‖); Allen v. Aronson Furniture Co., 971 F. Supp. 1259, 1261 (N.D. Ill.
1997). In 2007, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted a series of precertification summary judgment motions, citing the same boilerplate endorsement of the court‘s
discretion to issue such rulings. See, e.g., Villigran v. Central Ford, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 866, 882
(S.D. Tex. 2007). See also MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 53. (―It is well established that nothing in
Rule 23 precludes a district court from exercising its discretion to address the merits of the putative
class‘ claims on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or on a motion for summary
judgment before addressing class certification.‖) (citing cases); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR
R. MILLER, AND MARY KAY KANE, 7AA FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1785, 381 (3d ed. 2009)
(―Under circumstances in which the merits of plaintiffs‘ claims can be readily resolved on summary
judgment, defendant seeks an early disposition of those claims, and plaintiffs are not prejudiced as a
result, a district court does not abuse its discretion by resolving the merits on summary judgment
before considering the question of class certification.‖).
62. See, e.g., BRUNET & REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT § 10:16 (―A court should be vigilant
in deciding a summary judgment motion before certifying a class to save litigants unnecessary
expense and to economize on judicial time. For these reasons, we encourage prompt judicial
consideration of summary judgment motions in class actions‖); Rothstein, supra note 53; MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH § 11.34 (Federal Judicial Center 2004) (―[S]ummary judgment
is as appropriate in complex litigation as in routine cases‖); § 21.133 (―[M]ost courts agree, and
Rule 23(c)(1)(A) reflects, that such pre-certification rulings on threshold dispositive motions are
proper, and one study found a substantial rate of precertification rulings on motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment. Precertification rulings frequently dispose of all or part of the litigation.‖). A
minority of courts still look with disfavor on precertification summary judgment motions. See, e.g.,
Quezada v. Loan Center of Cal., Inc., 2009 WL 3711970, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (―However, early
resolution of a motion for summary judgment before class certification is often inappropriate . . . .‖).
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particularly since [the plaintiff] never moved to certify the purported
class. See Christensen v. Kiewit-Murdock Inv. Corp., 815 F.2d 206,
214 (2d Cir. 1987).63

With the Eisen decision64 no longer a doctrinal barrier to precertification consideration of summary judgment motions, courts have
articulated general principles to guide district judges‘ discretion in
considering such pre-certification summary judgment motions. Courts
agree that ruling on a dispositive motion prior to addressing class
certification may be appropriate where there is sufficient doubt
regarding the likelihood of success on the merits of the plaintiff‘s
claims.65 It is likewise appropriate to rule on a summary judgment
motion prior to class certification to prevent inefficiency66 or avoid
waste,67 particularly the high transaction costs associated with class

63. Schweizer v. Trans Union Corp., 136 F.3d 233, 239 (2d Cir. 1998). See also Adamson v.
Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 677 n.12 (10th Cir. 1988) (in appropriate cases, a court may use accelerated
summary judgment procedure before class certification to test the plaintiff‘s right to proceed to trial)
(citing WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1785).
64. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
65. See, e.g., Askew v. Holladay, 2009 WL 1767632 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (court may dismiss a
case on its own motion if it determines that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted or by using an accelerated summary judgment procedure before class certification to
test the plaintiffs‘ right to proceed to trial (citing Shook v. El Paso County, 386 F.3d 963, 974 (10th
Cir. 2004)); Adamson, 855 F.2d at 677 n.12. See also Cowen v. Bank United, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th
Cir. 1995); Floyd v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1987); Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d
1536, 1552 (6th Cir. 1984); Goldsby v. Ford Motor Co., 183 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948-49 (D. Mich.
2001) (if court determines plaintiff‘s claims are without merit, there is no harm in dismissing named
plaintiff‘s case without explicitly deciding class certification issue); Thurmond v. Compaq
Computer Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d 667, 683 (D. Tex. 2001) (on defendant‘s summary judgment
motion, a district court may examine the merits of the named plaintiffs‘ claims and dispose of those
claims prior to class certification); Allen v. Aronson Furniture Corp., 971 F. Supp. 1259, 1261 (N.D.
Ill. 1997); Trull v. Lason Sys., Inc., 982 F. Supp. 600, 603-04 (N.D. Ill. 1997). But cf. Quezada v.
Loan Center of Cal., Inc., 2009 WL 3711970, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (suggesting that precertification summary judgment is often inappropriate because ―the relative merits of the underlying
dispute are to have no impact upon the determination of the propriety of the class action,‖) (citing
Thompson v. County of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 241 (6th Cir. 1994); Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d
1536, 1552 (6th Cir. 1984). See also Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 630 (7th Cir. 2001)
(―It is preferable to review a motion for class certification first [because] a quick disposition on the
merits often is not possible.‖).
66. See, e.g., Cruz v. American Airlines, 150 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d on other
grounds, 356 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (resolution of cross-summary judgment motions might
eliminate need for court to consider class certification motion; therefore, district court could
consider summary judgment motions first in the interests of preserving judicial resources, as well as
the resources of the litigants).
67. See, e.g., Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 1536, 1552 (6th Cir. 1984) (―To require that
notice be sent to all potential plaintiffs in a class action when the underlying claim is without merit
is to promote inefficiency for its own sake‖). At times a court may consider a proposed class action
both meritless and wasteful. See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Humboldt County, 1999 WL 96017, at *2
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litigation, such as providing notice68 or discovery.69 In addition, it is
appropriate for a court to rule on summary judgment prior to class
certification where neither the plaintiff nor members of the putative class
would be prejudiced by the ruling.70
C.

Strategic Considerations Relating to Pre-Certification Summary
Judgment

As the Federal Judicial Center study documented, almost all precertification summary judgment motions are filed by defendants.71 This
fact comports with common sense because there would be little or no
point for a plaintiff to file a putative class action, and then request a
court to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to a summary
judgment. Until the court certifies a class action, the litigation remains

(N.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 1984) (―It is reasonable to
consider a Rule 56 motion [before class certification] when early resolution of a motion for
summary judgment seems likely to protect the parties and the court from needless and costly further
litigation.‖). See also Christensen v. Kiewit-Murdock Inv. Corp., 815 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1987)
(district court had discretion to decide summary judgment motion before class certification motion
to protect both the parties and the court from needless and costly further litigation); Quezada v.
Loan Center of Cal., Inc., 2009 WL 3711970, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 06, 2009) (―[H]owever, early
resolution of a motion for summary judgment before class certification often is inappropriate, and it
is within the court‘s discretion to decide a summary judgment motion first where granting the
motion ‗is likely to protect the parties and the court from needless further and costly litigation‘‖)
(citing West v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 355214, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2006)).
68. See, e.g., Trull v. Lason Sys., Inc., 982 F. Supp. 600, 603-04 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (granting
summary judgment prior to class certification is an appropriate procedure) (citing Marx v. Centran
Corp., 747 F.2d 1536, 1552 (6th Cir. 1984) for proposition that ―[t]o require notice to be sent to all
potential plaintiffs in a class action when the underlying claim is without merit is to promote
inefficiency for its own sake.‖).
69. See, e.g., Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 446 (D. Me. 2005) (stay of class action
against tobacco company defendants warranted pending determination of defendants‘ summary
judgment motion which could be dispositive and plaintiffs‘ pending motion for class certification
could require extensive discovery).
70. See, e.g., Curtin v. United Airlines, Inc., 275 F.3d 88, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (―[W]here the
merits of the plaintiffs‘ claims can be readily resolved on summary judgment, where the defendants
seeks an early disposition of those claims, and where the plaintiffs are not prejudiced thereby, a
district court does not abuse its discretion by resolving the merits before considering the question of
class certification‖); Villagran v. Central Ford, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 866, 882 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (same);
Coburn v. Daimler Chrysler Serv. North America, L.L.C., 2005 WL 736657, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(no unfairness in proceeding to adjudicate summary judgment prior to class certification based on
numerous prior scheduling orders); Hyman v. First Union Corp., 982 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 1997)
(deciding summary judgment motion before class certification motion because neither party would
suffer significant prejudice, and it ―was more practicable to do so‖). But cf. In re New Motor
Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 229 F.R.D. 35, 40-41 (D. Me. 2005) (granting plaintiffs‘
motion to stay action on defendant General Motor‘s summary judgment motion; judge not
sufficiently altered to defendant‘s desire for accelerated summary judgment).
71. See supra note 38.
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an individual lawsuit against the defendant. Thus, assuming a court
granted a plaintiff‘s summary judgment prior to class certification, that
ruling would only bind the named class representative, but not the
putative class (which has yet to be certified).72
Correlatively, it is fairly well-accepted that defendants, then, must
make a strategic decision whether to seek a summary adjudication of a
named plaintiff‘s claims, prior to class certification.73 Should the
defendant prevail on a pre-certification motion, then the defendant gains
a binding merits ruling only on the class representative‘s claims.74 The
defendant does not gain a binding merits determination against the
putative class, however.75 Instead, most courts that have considered
summary judgment motions prior to class certification observe that if the
court grants the defendant‘s summary judgment motion, then the class

72. This possibility raises the specter of one-way intervention, and waiver of the protection
against one-way intervention, discussed supra at nn.57-58. In theory a plaintiff could attempt, after
a positive summary judgment ruling, to assert that ruling as collateral estoppels after class
certification. The author knows of no reported decision permitting offensive collateral estoppels of
a plaintiff-favoring summary judgment ruling prior to class certification, asserted after class
certification.
73. See generally BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 5, at § 10:16 (tactics regarding summary
judgment and class actions; noting that because a trial order certifying a class action increases the
settlement value of the case considerably, defense counsel should evaluate the potential filing of a
motion for summary judgment before consideration of a class certification).
74. See Schwarzschild v. Tse, 69 F.3d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1995) (―a decision rendered by the
district court before a class that has been properly certified and notified is not binding on anyone but
the named plaintiffs‖); Brotherson v. The Professional Basketball Club, L.L.C., 2009 WL 3286112
(W.D. Wash. 2009) (order disposing of claims on summary judgment would not bind putative class
members); Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d
960, 974 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (dismissal prior to class certification is res judicata as to the class
representatives, but has no effect on the putative class members); see generally JOSEPH M.
MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3.3 (―Defendants should consider, however,
that in moving to dismiss or for summary judgment prior to class certification, prevailing on the
motion will provide them only with stare decisis protection rather than res judicata protection as to
absent class members‖).
75. See Schwarzschild v. Tse, 69 F.3d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1995); Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d
541, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1984) (―Where the defendant assumes the risk that summary judgment in his
favor will have only stare decisis effect on members of the putative class, it is within the discretion
of the district court to rule on the summary judgment motion first‖); Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp.
585, 600 (D. Haw. 1985).
However, where defendants seek summary judgment knowing of the possibility that
other plaintiffs will enter the case and not be bound thereby, and where defendants are
willing to settle for the benefits of stare decisis rather than risk those of res judicata, it is
not for the plaintiff or the court to deter them from assuming the risk.
Id. (citing Wright, 742 F.2d at 541. See also Roberts v. American Airlines, Inc., 526 F.2d 757, 76263 (7th Cir. 1975) (summary judgment against named plaintiffs would not protect defendants
against other members of the class under doctrine of res judicata).
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certification motion becomes moot.76 Unless another litigant or putative
class member ―picks up the dropped spear,‖ the class litigation will
effectively end.77
Defendants, however, may not leverage a successful precertification summary judgment motion―as against an individual named
class representative―into a class-wide binding effect by seeking class
certification after a court has dismissed the plaintiff‘s claims for lack of
merit.78 On the contrary, defendants may obtain a class-wide preclusive
effect if they successfully move for summary judgment on the merits of
the class claims, after a court certifies a class.79 Judge Richard Posner,
for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has aptly
described the defendant‘s choices:
Class actions are expensive to defend. One way to try to knock one off
at low cost is to seek summary judgment before the suit is certified as a
class action. A decision that the claim of the named plaintiffs lack
merit ordinarily, though not invariably, disqualifies the named
plaintiffs as proper class representatives. The effect is to moot the

76. See, e.g., Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F.
Supp. 2d 960, 974 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (entry of summary judgment against class representatives‘
claims had effect of mooting motion for class certification); Beth V. by Yvonne V. v. Carroll, 876
F. Supp. 1415, 1422 (D. Pa. 1995) (where defendant is entitled to summary judgment prior to class
certification, court could dismiss motion for class certification as moot); Haas v. Boeing Co., 1992
WL 221335, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1992) (granting defendant‘s summary judgment motion and
denying class certification motion as moot); cf. Jibson v. Michigan Educ. Ass‘n-NEA, 30 F.3d 723,
734 (6th Cir. 1994) (where district court properly determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to
relief and granted summary judgment to defendant, court not required to rule on the motion for class
certification).
77. Nothing, however, prevents another class representative from stepping forward to
represent the class.
78. See Ortiz v. Lyon Mgmt. Group, Inc., 157 Cal. App. 4th 604, 620 (4th Dist. 2007)
(―[D]efendant cannot cite a single case in which a defendant obtained class certification after first
obtaining summary judgment against the named plaintiff‘s individual claim‖). But cf., Benfield v.
Mocatta Metals Corp., 1993 WL 148978 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (―Thus, where, as here, a plaintiff‘s
claims are dismissed prior to class certification, absent class members would be prejudiced if a court
subsequently granted certification, and bound them to an adverse judgment‖). See also Bieneman v.
City of Chicago, 838 F.2d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1988) (―[A] class representative who has lost on the
merits may have a duty to the class to oppose certification, to avoid the preclusive effect of the
judgment . . . .‖).
79. See, e.g., Dorfsman v. Law School Admission Council, Inc., 2001 WL 1754726, at *2
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (―It is the actual certification of an action as a class action . . . which alone gives
birth to ‗class as jurisprudential entity,‘ changes the action from a mere individual suit with class
allegations into a true class action . . . and provides that sharp line of demarcation between an
individual action seeking to become a class action and an actual class action‖); Robinson v. Sheriff
of Cook County, 167 F.3d 1155, 1157 (7th Cir. 1999) (―The plaintiff‘s lawyer . . . would not be
happy to have this case certified as a class action and then dismissed; that would have res judicata
effect on any unnamed class members who did not opt-out‖).
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question whether to certify the suit as a class action unless the lawyers
for the class manage to find another representative. They could not
here because the ground upon which district court threw out the
plaintiff‘s claims would apply equally to any other member of the
class. After granting the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment,
therefore, and since (as was predictable, given the district judge‘s
grounds) no one stepped forward to pick up the spear dropped by the
named plaintiffs, the judge denied the motion for class certification.
When the procedure we just described is followed, the defendant loses
the preclusive effect on subsequent suits against him if class
certification but saves the added expense of defending a class action
and may be content to oppose members of the class one by one, as it
were, by moving for summary judgment, every time he is sued, before
the judge presiding over the suit decides whether to certify it as a class
action.80

Whether to pursue summary judgment adjudication prior to class
certification, then, chiefly embodies a defendant‘s kind of strategic
Sophie‘s choice. On the one hand, if a defendant assesses that a
plaintiff‘s factual and legal allegations are fatally defective, the
defendant has little to lose by pursuing summary judgment at that point.
If the defendant pursues a summary judgment motion and prevails, the
defendant assumes two possible negative risks: Either another plaintiff
may pick up the class action spear, or alternatively the defendant will be
subjected to successive rounds of repetitive litigation by individual class
members pursuing individual claims.
Anecdotal experience suggests, however, that when a defendant
defeats a named class representative‘s claims through summary
judgment prior to class certification, neither of the two downside risks
occur.81 Thus, a prevailing defendant may be reasonably confident that

80. Cowen v. Bank United, 70 F.3d 937, 941-42 (7th Cir. 1995). See also Postow v. OBA
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n., 627 F.2d 1370, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (defendants, in moving for
summary judgment prior to class certification, assume the risk that a judgment in their favor will not
protect them from subsequent suits by other potential class members, ―for only the slim reed of
stare decisis stands between them and the prospective onrush of litigants‖). See also MCLAUGHLIN,
supra note 53, at § 3:3 (―The sparse case law addressing whether a defendant may obtain
certification of a plaintiff class after defendant has obtained a favorable ruling on the merits of the
named plaintiff‘s individual claim holds that it cannot.‖).
81. The author knows of no empirical data documenting the extent to which plaintiffs that
suffer a defeat at summary judgment, prior to class certification, are replaced by another class
representative who then successfully pursues the class litigation. In addition, the author knows of
no empirical study documenting the incidence of subsequent, repetitive individual litigation after a
named class representative‘s claims have been dismissed prior to class certification. From
conversation with defense counsel over approximately twenty years, defense counsel report that
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another class representative will not step up to pursue the class litigation,
nor will successive plaintiffs renew individual litigation against the
defendant based on the allegations dismissed by summary judgment.
Moreover, if a defendant prevails on summary judgment prior to class
certification, this merits-based determination tends to lessen the
enthusiasm of counsel to pursue further individual or class litigation,
unless counsel can remedy the pleading defects and be confident to
survive a stare decisis ruling in subsequent litigation.
On the other hand, when presented with a factually and legally
deficient class action case, some defense attorneys strategically prefer to
allow the class to be certified,82 and then move for summary judgment in
order to gain a class-wide preclusive effect of the summary judgment
ruling. Again, based on anecdotal evidence, defense attorneys elect this
option less often, because pursuing this strategy involves transaction
costs, such as certification discovery and extensive certification motions
practice that could otherwise be avoided by a pre-certification summary
judgment motion. In addition, seeking summary judgment after class
certification entails the added risk that the court might not grant the
defendant‘s summary judgment, which would place the defendant in a
weakened bargaining position, facing the prospect of class trial,
additional transaction costs, and a forced settlement.
It should be noted, however, that defense counsel routinely motions
for summary judgment after class certification, even where it is not
abundantly certain that the plaintiff‘s allegations are fatally defective.
And, in some instances, courts may receive cross-motions for summary
judgment by both plaintiffs and defendants after class certification. If
the court grants either parties‘ motion, the plaintiff or defendant gains
the class-wide preclusive effect of the court‘s ruling. Indeed, some
courts may prefer to defer ruling on the summary judgment motion until
after class certification, precisely to provide such a class-wide preclusive
effect to its ruling.
Notwithstanding that summary judgment is available to the litigants
after class certification (which provides the additional benefit of classwide preclusion), there are powerful arguments in support of the thesis
that deciding summary judgment prior to class certification is a preferred
approach to handling complex class action litigation. The historical

they rarely, if ever, face additional litigation if they prevail on a pre-certification summary judgment
motion.
82. In situations where defense counsel is convinced that the plaintiff‘s case is fatally
defective, some defense counsel elect not to oppose class certification. This is a highly unusual
situation in class action practice, but it does occur.
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resistance to pre-certification summary judgment in the class action
context has eroded considerably over time, as the realities of the
transaction costs of complex litigation have become manifest.
Transaction costs for class litigation in the digital age have grown
exponentially. In addition, recent pleading jurisprudence, as well as
class certification standards, reflects the judiciary‘s growing concern
with liberal notice pleading and easy class certification, in light of the in
terrorem effect of class certification. As discussed below, these trends
are now coalescing to buttress the argument in favor of enhanced or
mandatory summary judgment prior to class certification.
III. CLASS ACTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE
POST-TWOMBLY/IQBAL ERA
As indicated above, in the early 1990s when the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules was considering various reforms to Rule 23,
one proposal would have codified a provision explicitly permitting
judges to rule on dispositive Rule 12 or Rule 56 motions prior to ruling
on class certification motions.83 The Advisory Committee abandoned
this proposed amendment after 1995.
In the ensuing fifteen years, federal courts have undergone a seachange in attitudes towards civil litigation generally, and complex
litigation specifically. Four trends are noteworthy and bear on
consideration of the role of summary judgment in class action litigation.
First, the Supreme Court has retreated from the norm of liberal notice
pleading and instead articulated a regime of heightened pleading
requirements.84 Second, federal appellate courts have now clarified the
―rigorous analysis‖ standard for class certification, in effect endorsing
heightened class certification requirements.85
Third, prominent
academics have, in various formulations, urged that courts utilize some
form of merit-based analysis in connection with class certification.86
Finally, the debate over pre-certification discovery converges with these
trends to support the argument for enhanced summary judgment practice
prior to class certification.
Each of these trends is discussed in the following sections. More
importantly, each of these trends―and the convergence of these
trends―support the argument for enhanced summary judgment practice

83.
84.
85.
86.
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prior to class certification. Requiring summary adjudication prior to
class certification is consistent with these trends and, as argued below,
embodies a preferable procedural approach to resolving the several
problems that have animated these developing trends.
A.

The Heightened Pleading Trend

Perhaps the most revolutionary development in federal practice in
the past five years has been the Supreme Court‘s retrenchment in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly87 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,88 of the liberal notice
pleading regime embodied in Conley v. Gibson89 and its progeny.90
Significantly for the conversation concerning summary judgment
practice in complex litigation, both Twombly91 and Iqbal92 are grounded
in fairness and efficiency rationales, including in Twombly the in
terrorem effect of complex litigation on defendants to settle.

87. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The Twombly and Iqbal decisions have generated a substantial body
of academic and practitioner commentary. See generally Damon Amyx, The Toll of Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly: An Argument for Taking the Edge Off the Advantage Given Defendants, 33 VT.
L. REV. 323 (2008); Janice R. Ballard, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: Has the Court Re-Set the Bar
With a Heightened Pleading Standard?, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 183 (2008); Bone, Twombly,
supra note 11, at 873.; Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading
Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (2008); Hannon, Note, supra
note 11; Harvey Kurzweil, Eamon O‘Kelly, & Susannah P. Torpey, Twombly: Another Swing of the
Pleading Pendulum, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 115 (2008); Smith, supra note 11; A. Benjamin Spencer,
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2009); Spencer, supra note 11; Michelle
Spiegel, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Question of a Heightened Standard of Pleading in Qualified
Immunity Cases, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUBLIC POL‘Y SIDEBAR 375 (2009); Paul Stancil,
Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90 (2009); Pleading Standards, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 252 (2009); J. Douglas Richards, Symposium, The Future of Pleading in the Federal
System: Debating the Impact of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 82 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 849 (2008).
88. 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
89. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
90. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511-12 (2002) (rejecting heightened
pleading requirement in employment discrimination civil rights litigation; upholding liberal
pleading requirements under FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (a)(2)); Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163,
164 (1993) (federal courts may not apply more stringent pleading standard in civil rights cases
alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). In dissent in Twombly, Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg noted that Conley‘s ―no set of facts‖ language had been cited by the Supreme Court in
dozens of the Court‘s opinions. ―In not one of those sixteen opinions was the language
‗questioned,‘ ‗criticized,‘ or ‗explained away.‘ Indeed, today‘s opinion is the first by any Member
of this Court to express any doubt as to the adequacy of the Conley formulation.‖ See Twombly,
550 U.S. at 571, 577 n.4 (J. Stevens and Ginsburg, dissenting) (citing cases in which Court endorsed
the Conley liberal pleading standard).
91. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
92. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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Twombly93 involved an antitrust class action brought on behalf of
local telephone service subscribers against major telephone companies,
alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.94 The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant telephone companies had engaged in
parallel, conspiratorial conduct to inhibit the growth of local phone
companies, and to eliminate competition in territories where any one
company was dominant.95 The federal district court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
under Rule 12(b)(6),96 but the United States Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the district court had applied the incorrect pleading
standard.97 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question
concerning the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy
through allegations of parallel conduct.98
The Supreme Court reversed.99 In considering the proper pleading
standard under Rule 8(a)(2),100 the Court revisited standards developed
pursuant to the Court‘s landmark Conley101 decision. The Court
concluded that while a complaint that is challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff has an
obligation to provide the grounds for entitlement to relief, which
requires ―more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action.‖102
In order to withstand a threshold Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
the Court set forth a pleading standard of reasonable plausibility in
support of the claim, constituting an entitlement to relief.103 Pursuant to
this standard, a pleader‘s factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculation level.104 The Court cautiously

93. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
95. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
96. 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
97. 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005).
98. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553.
99. Id.
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), which requires that a pleader set forth only ―a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.‖
101. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
102. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
103. Id.
104. Id., 550 U.S. at 556. Applying the standard to the plaintiff‘s Section 1 Sherman Act
antirust allegations, the Court held that:
[S]tating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to
suggest an agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement
does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for
enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
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indicated that it did not require heightened pleading of specifics, ―but
only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.‖105
In the context of the Twombly litigation, the Court‘s plausibility
standard for pleading antitrust allegations was largely grounded in the
Court‘s appreciation of the substantial transaction costs―especially
discovery costs―entailed in complex antitrust litigation.106 The Court
noted: ―Thus, it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust
complaint in advance of discovery . . . but quite another to forget that
proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive.‖107 The Court also
was not sanguine that groundless cases could be ―weeded out‖ by careful
case management techniques early in the discovery process,108 or that
case management techniques would suffice to curb discovery abuses in
dubious, complex cases.109 Furthermore, the Court linked problems
relating to discovery abuse with the potential in terrorem settlement
pressure placed upon defendants, especially in complex cases:

illegal agreement.
Id.
105. Id., 550 U.S. at 570. The Court held that: ―Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged
their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.‖ Id.
106. Id. at 558.
107. Id. The Court added: ―As we indicated over 20 years ago . . . , ‗a district court must retain
the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual
controversy to proceed.‘‖
In forceful language, dissenting Justices Stevens and Ginsburg rejected the majority‘s central
policy rationale for its heightened pleading standard:
The transparent policy concern that drives the decision is the interest in protecting
antitrust defendants―who in this case are some of the wealthiest corporations in our
economy―from the burdens of pretrial discovery . . . Even if it were not apparent that
the legal fees petitioners have incurred in arguing the merits of their Rule 12(b)(6)
motion have far exceeded the cost of limited discovery, or that those discovery costs
would burden the respondents as well as petitioners, that concern would not provide an
adequate justification for this law-changing decision. For in the final analysis it is only
lack of confidence in the ability of trial judges to control discovery, buttressed by
appellate judges‘ independent appraisal of the plausibility of profoundly serious factual
allegations, that could account for this stark break from precedent.
Id. at 596-97 (J. Stevens and J. Ginsburg, dissenting).
108. Id. at 559.
109. Id. Dissenting Justices Stevens and Ginsburg contended that the majority‘s practical
concerns in antitrust litigation did not merit ―the court‘s dramatic departure from settled procedural
law.‖ See id. at 573. The dissenters argued that the majority‘s practical concerns merited careful
case management, strict discovery control, careful scrutiny of evidence at summary judgment, and
lucid instructions to the jury, but they these concerns did not justify the dismissal of an adequately
pleaded complaint without even requiring the defendants to file answers denying the charges that
they had engaged in collective decision-making. Id. at 572-73.
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And it is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot be
solved by ―careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment
stage,‖ much less ―lucid instructions to juries‖; . . . the threat of
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even
anemic cases before reaching those proceedings. 110

More broadly, the Court in Twombly interred any conflicting
pleading standards derived from Conley’s famous ―no set of facts‖
language.111 The Court suggested that, after ―puzzling the profession for
50 years,‖ the prevailing Conley standard was ―best forgotten as an
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a
claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any
set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.‖112 The
Conley language did not, in the Court‘s view, provide a minimum
standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint‘s survival.113
In Iqbal,114 the Supreme Court laid to rest the question whether
Twombly’s plausibility pleading standard applied beyond the antitrust
context. Iqbal involved the claims of a Pakistani Muslim detained by
federal authorities after the September 11th terrorist attacks.115 Iqbal
alleged that he was deprived of various constitutional protections while
he was in federal custody and that he was subjected to harsh conditions
of confinement by virtue of his race, religion, or national origin.116 He
sued various federal officials, including the former Attorney General of
the United States and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.117
The defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity from suit
and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.118 Both the district
court and appellate court rejected the defendant‘s motion to dismiss,
concluding the plaintiff‘s complaint was sufficient to state a claim
despite the defendant‘s official status.119

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Iqbal‘s pleadings were
insufficient.120 Relying on Twombly, the Court held that although the
Rule 8 pleading standard did not require detailed factual allegations, ―it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.‖121 The Court reaffirmed two working principles from
Twombly: (1) the tenet that a court must accept as true all allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,122 and (2)
only a claim that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss.123 Applying these principles to the allegations in Iqbal‘s
complaint, the Court held that the plaintiff‘s bare assertions, much like
the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, amounted to nothing more than a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a constitutional discrimination
claim. As such, the allegations were conclusory and not entitled to be
assumed true: ―It is the conclusory nature of the respondent‘s
allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that
disentitles them to the presumption of truth.‖124
The Court in Iqbal elaborated on three crucial pleading points.
First, the Court held that its plausibility standard announced in Twombly
was not limited to antitrust cases. Instead, the Court stated that the
Court‘s decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for all
civil actions and that it applied to antitrust and discrimination cases
alike.125 Second, the Court held that the question presented by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss―challenging the legal sufficiency of
pleading allegations――does not turn on controls that a district court
might place on the discovery process.‖126 In Iqbal, then, the Court again

120. Id. at 1942-43. Four Justices dissented, and would have held that Iqbal‘s complaint
satisfied Rule 8(a)(2). The dissenters argued that the fallacy of the majority‘s position was in
looking at the plaintiff‘s relevant assertions in isolation. See id. at 1954-61 (J. Souter, Stevens,
Ginsburg and Breyer, dissenting).
121. Id. at 1949.
122. Id. The Court held that:
[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.
Id.
123. Id. at 1950. ―But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged―but it has not ‗show[n]‘ that the
‗pleader is entitled to relief.‖
124. Id. at 1951.
125. Id. at 1953.
126. Id. The Court indicated that its rejection of the careful case management approach was
especially important in suits where government official defendants are entitled to assert the defense
of qualified immunity. ―The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from
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rejected the argument that careful case management could temper the
burdens imposed by allowing a legally deficient complaint to proceed.127
Third, the Court held that ―the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
require courts to credit a complaint‘s conclusory statement without
reference to it factual context.‖128
Taken together, the Court‘s decisions in Twombly129 and Iqbal130
represent a ratcheting-up of pleading standards in federal court.
Twombly involved underlying class action litigation;131 Iqbal did not.132
Although technically eschewing the language of ―heightened pleading,‖
the Court in both cases effectively created more substantial pleading
burdens to withstand dismissal at the pleading stage.
The Court‘s rationales supporting enhanced pleading standards in
both cases reflect the Court‘s concerns with the realities of modern civil
litigation. In Twombly, the Court justified more stringent review of
pleading allegations in light of the substantial transaction costs generated
by discovery in complex litigation, coupled with the in terrorem effect
of such litigation on the defendant‘s willingness to settle.133 Hence, the
Court coupled an efficiency rationale with a fairness concern.134 And,
although Iqbal did not involve class litigation, the Court expressed
similar concern for the disruptive and burdensome effect of the litigation
process on governmental officials―most notably discovery.135
Moreover, in both cases the Court reiterated its skepticism that careful
case management techniques could serve to temper transaction costs,
burdensome intrusions, or litigation fairness.136

the concerns of litigation, including ‗the avoidance of disruptive discovery.‘‖ Id. In dissent, Justice
Breyer argued that the litigants had not presented sufficient evidence to show that careful case
management techniques could not be fashioned to protect the defendants from burdensome
intrusions. Justice Breyer suggested, consistent with the Second Circuit‘s decision, that a trial court
―can structure discovery in ways that diminish the risk of imposing unwarranted burdens on public
officials.‖ See id. at 1961-62 (J. Breyer, dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1954.
129. 550 U.S. 544.
130. 129 S. Ct. at 1937.
131. 550 U.S. at 544.
132. 129 S. Ct. at 1937.
133. See 550 U.S. at 544.
134. Id.
135. 129 S. Ct. at 1937.
136. 550 U.S. 544 (2007); 129 S. Ct. at 1937
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Heightened Class Certification Standards

The trend towards requiring greater specificity and plausibility in
pleading civil cases has been paralleled in recent years by a similar
appellate trend requiring heightened class certification standards.137 In a
series of appellate decisions, federal courts have ratcheted-up the
standards of production and proof in satisfaction of class certification.138
Moreover, the rationales underlying the articulation of these heightened
class certification standards accord with the rationales supporting
heightened pleading standards: fairness and efficiency.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has offered perhaps the clearest
articulation of heightened class certification standards in its 2008
decision of In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation.139 In what
may be the most influential decision relating to class certification since
the Supreme Court decided Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,140 the Third
Circuit issued a sweeping opinion articulating standards of proof likely
to have a tremendous impact on all class litigation.141 The Hydrogen
Peroxide decision carries significant weight because Chief Judge
Anthony Scirica, the opinion‘s author, has served as the Chair of the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, on the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, and Chair of the Judicial
Conference Working Group on Mass Torts.142
Since 1982, federal courts routinely have recited that class
certification is proper only ―if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous
analysis, that the prerequisites‖ of Rule 23 are met.143 In Hydrogen
Peroxide, Judge Scirica insightfully noted that extant class certification
jurisprudence provided federal courts with little guidance on the proper
standard of proof in implementing this rigorous analysis language.144
Hence, the Third Circuit stepped into this breach and articulated
standards of proof district courts should apply at class certification. 145
These standards, consistent with emerging heightened pleading

137. See supra note 13.
138. See supra note 13.
139. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
140. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
141. 552 F.3d at 305.
142. In 2008, Chief Justice Roberts named Judge Scirica as Chair of the Executive Committee
of the Judicial Conference. Over his lengthy career, Judge Scirica has been extensively involved
with reform of Federal Rule 23.
143. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
144. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 315-16.
145. Id.
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jurisprudence, reflected a growing concern with lax application of class
certification standards.
The Third Circuit clarified three key aspects of class certification
procedure that heightened judicial obligations and the burdens of
production and persuasion by the proponents seeking class certification.
First, a district court must make findings that all Rule 23 requirements
are met, and may not certify a class action based merely upon a
―threshold showing‖ by the party seeking certification.146 Second, a
district court must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to
certification, even if that determination overlaps with merits-based
questions intertwined with the underlying claims.147 And third, a district
court must consider all conflicting expert testimony.148
The Hydrogen Peroxide litigation involved an antitrust class action
by direct purchasers of hydrogen peroxide and related chemicals against
chemical manufacturers.149 The plaintiffs brought the action under § 4
of the Clayton Act, alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade violating §
1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.150 After extensive discovery and a
certification hearing including conflicting expert testimony, the district
court certified the class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).151 The
defendants sought interlocutory appeal contending that the class
certification failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)‘s predominance
requirement.152 The defendants argued that the court erred in (1)
applying too lenient a standard of proof, (2) failing to meaningfully
consider the defense expert‘s views while crediting the plaintiff‘s
experts, and (3) applying a presumption of antitrust impact under
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.153 The Third Circuit agreed, and remanded
the case for further review.154
Historically, antitrust actions have been among the easiest to certify
because courts have found conspiracy allegations sufficient to bootstrap
class-wide findings of predominance required by Rule 23(b)(3). The
Hydrogen Peroxide decision, then, marked a significant departure for the
undemanding class certification of antitrust cases.155
However,

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
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552 F.3d at 309.
Id. at 312; 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977).
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notwithstanding the antitrust context of its rulings, the Third Circuit was
emphatic that the clarified standards of proof articulated in its decision
applied to all substantive class actions, not just antitrust actions.156 The
Third Circuit announced that the district court had erred in applying too
lenient a standard of proof with respect to Rule 23 requirements and that
courts may no longer accept a mere ―threshold showing‖ by plaintiffs.157
Thus, the Third Circuit set forth clarified standards of proof to guide
class certification analysis in all future proposed class actions.
First, Rule 23 class certification requirements are not mere pleading
requirements. Courts may delve beyond the pleadings to determine if
class certification requirements are met, and courts must make findings
that each Rule 23 requirement is satisfied.158 ―Factual determinations
necessary to make Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of
the evidence.159 In other words, to certify a class the district court must
find the evidence more likely than not establishes each fact necessary to
meet the requirements of Rule 23.‖160 The evidence and arguments a
court considers in evaluating the suitability of a proposed class for
certification also requires rigorous analysis. Importantly, a party‘s mere
assurance that it intends or plans to meet certification requirements in
the future is insufficient.161
Second, a court must resolve disputed issues raised at class
certification:
Under these Rule 23 standards, a district court exercising proper
discretion in deciding whether to certify a class will resolve factual
disputes by a preponderance of the evidence and make findings that
each Rule 23 requirement is met or is not met, having considered all
the relevant evidence and arguments presented by the parties. 162

Third, a court may not decline to resolve relevant certification
disputes because there may be an overlap between the certification
requirement and an underlying merits issue.163 The Court stated that this
evaluation does not violate the Eisen rule.164 Hence, a court‘s rigorous

156. Id. at 321-22.
157. Id. at 321.
158. Id. at 320.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 321.
162. Id. at 320.
163. Id. at 316-17.
164. Id. (citing Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (7th Cir.
2001) and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)).
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analysis may include preliminary inquiry into the merits; a court may
consider the substantive elements of the case to envision how an actual
trial would proceed.165
Fourth, expert opinion testimony requires rigorous analysis and
should not be uncritically accepted as establishing a Rule 23
requirement, merely because the court holds that the testimony should
not be excluded.166 Weighing conflicting expert testimony may be
integral to a rigorous analysis of Rule 23.167 In the underlying litigation,
the district court erroneously gave weight only to the plaintiff‘s expert
testimony that class-wide impact could plausibly be demonstrated by
two possible methodologies, while not crediting conflicting defense
expert testimony that those methodologies were incorrect and
unworkable.168
Judge Scirica partially drew authority for the Court‘s conclusions
based on Rule 23 amendments that became effective in 2003. Rule
23(c)(1)(A) was amended to change the timing of class certification, to
encourage discovery into certification requirements, and to avoid
premature certification decisions.169 The 2003 amended Advisory
Committee Note introduced the concept of a trial plan, to focus judicial
attention on a rigorous analysis of a likely trial on the merits.170 The
2003 amendments eliminated conditional class certification. The
Standing Committee advised that conditional class certification was
deleted to avoid suggestion that certification could be granted on a
tentative basis, even if it was unclear that Rule 23 requirements were
satisfied.171
The Third Circuit also addressed various formulaic standards the
Court indicated will no longer suffice to permit class certification.
Generally, the Court repudiated any mechanical language that might
signify that the plaintiff‘s burden at class certification was lenient.172
The Court indicated that it was incorrect that a plaintiff need only
demonstrate an ―intention‖ to try the case in a manner that satisfies the
predominance requirement. Consequently, courts misapply Rule 23 if

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
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they find a plaintiff need only make a ―threshold showing‖ of
certification requirements.173 Emphatically, the Court instructed:
A ―threshold showing‖ could signify, incorrectly, that the burden on
the party seeking certification is a lenient one (such as a prima facie
showing or a burden of production) or that the party seeking
certification receives deference or a presumption in its favor. So
defined, ―threshold showing‖ is an inadequate and improper
standard.174

In antitrust class actions, the Court repudiated the notion that in
horizontal price-fixing conspiracy cases courts, when in doubt, may
apply a presumption favoring class certification. The Third Circuit
concluded that such presumptions ―invite error.‖175 Moreover, the Court
rejected the notion that certification-favoring presumptions can relieve
district courts of their obligations to conduct a rigorous analysis in any
type of class action. ―Although the trial court has discretion to grant or
deny class certification, the court should not suppress ‗doubt‘ as to
whether a Rule 23 requirement is met—no matter what the area of
substantive law.‖176
Finally, the Third Circuit addressed the Supreme Court‘s famous
suggestion in Amchem, that the Rule 23(b)(3) ―predominance test is
readily met in certain cases alleging securities fraud or violations of the
antitrust laws.‖177 Acknowledging this, the Third Circuit instead
contended that ―it does not follow that a court should relax its
certification analysis, or presume a certification requirement is met,
merely because a plaintiff‘s claims fall within one of those substantive
categories.‖178
The Third Circuit also drew support for its clarification of
certification standards from the parallel universe of heightened pleading
cases, most notably Twombly.179 The Court recognized the relevance of
those pleading decisions for heightened scrutiny at the point of class
certification, and for similar rationales relating to fairness and

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
in Iqbal.

Id. at 321.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 321-22.
Id. (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997)).
In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 322.
Id. at 310. The Hydrogen Peroxide appeal was decide before the Supreme Court decision
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efficiency.180 Indeed, much of the court‘s analysis surrounding the class
certification process resonates in similar analysis in Twombly.181
The Hydrogen Peroxide decision sets forth a lengthy exposition of
class certification jurisprudence, the rigorous analysis standard, and the
rationales justifying heightened scrutiny of class certification
requirements.182 The Third Circuit‘s exposition joins other federal
appellate circuits that―within the last five years―similarly have
embraced more stringent merit-based evaluations of class certification
requirements.183 The general thrust of these decisions, collectively,
requires a more careful, calibrated examination of whether a proposed
class action may proceed, and eschews facile class certification.
C.

Academic Commentary and the Merits-Evaluation Trend

The trend among federal courts in articulating heightened pleading
standards and rigorous class certification standards has been paralleled
by a trend in academic commentary over the last decade urging federal
courts to adopt some form of merit-based analysis in the class action
context.184 Almost all this commentary is grounded in similar rationales:
that complex class litigation ought not to proceed until a court takes a
meaningful ―peek‖ at the merits, in the interests of efficiency and
fairness. This commentary is grounded in the recognition that complex
litigation is unlike ordinary or bipolar litigation,185 that class action
litigation entails substantial transactional and reputational costs and

180. But proper discretion does not soften the rule: a class may not be certified without a
finding that each Rule 23 requirement is met. Careful application of Rule 23 accords with the
pivotal status of class certification in large-scale litigation, because ―denying or granting class
certification is often the defining moment in class actions (for it may sound the ―death knell‖ of the
litigation on the part of plaintiffs, or create unwarranted pressure to settle non-meritorious claims on
the part of defendants). . . .‖ Newton, 259 F.3d 154 at 162. See id. at 167 (―Irrespective of the
merits, certification decisions may have a decisive effect on litigation.‖); see also Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978). In some cases, class certification ―may force a
defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of
potentially ruinous liability.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 23 Advisory Committee's Note, 1998 Amendments.
Accordingly, the potential for unwarranted settlement pressure ―is a factor we weigh in our
certification calculus.‖ Newton, 259 F.3d at 168 n.8. The Supreme Court recently cautioned that
certain antitrust class actions may present prime opportunities for plaintiffs to exert pressure upon
defendants to settle weak claims. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
181. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
182. See 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
183. See supra note 13.
184. See supra note 14.
185. See, e.g,, Hazard, supra note 14, at 2 (noting that the valuation of claims in ordinary
litigation is more easily accomplished than in class action litigation; valuation of class claims is
more difficult for four enumerated reasons).
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litigation burdens,186 and that class action litigation―at the point of class
certification―asserts inertial pressure on defendants to settle the
litigation.187 Moreover, this commentary is grounded in the premise that
at least some class action litigation is frivolous or legally deficient, and
ought not to proceed or to be settled.188 The rationales underlying the
academic proposals for merits-based class certification parallel the
reasoning underlying the decisions in Twombly,189 Iqbal,190 and the
Hydrogen Peroxide191 line of cases.
The emergence of academic commentary suggesting merits-based
analysis is noteworthy because of the longstanding jurisprudential
barrier presented by the so-called Eisen rule, which historically has been
urged as prohibiting any merits-based analysis at the class certification
stage.192 Generally, plaintiffs especially resisted any judicial scrutiny of
the underlying merits of their class allegations, preferring the settlement
leverage gained through uncritical class certification. Defendants, on the
other hand, have urged courts to apply a rigorous analysis standard at
class certification that would permit courts to probe beyond the
pleadings to evaluate whether the asserted claims and defenses―in
relation to the underlying law―may be pursued in the class action
format.193 In both instances, plaintiffs and defendants alike have
invoked the Eisen rule in support of their contentions. Against the

186. See Bone & Evans, supra note 14, at 1286-1319 (analyzing error-cost factors in class
certification decisions).
187. See generally McGuire, supra note 14, at 370-76 (discussing the impact of class
certification and the benefits of a preliminary assessment of the merits of the underlying claims);
Bone & Evans, supra note 14, at 1286-1319; Hazard, supra note 185, at 10 (discussing problem of
settlement blackmail). See also In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995)
(same).
188. See generally Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 1849 (recognizing the existence of
frivolous class actions that are settled for their nuisance value only); Bone & Evans, supra note 14,
at 1328 (―A preliminary screening of the merits in all class actions will help deter frivolous suits by
controlling abuse of the settlement leverage certification creates.‖).
189. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
190. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
191. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
192. McGuire, 168 F.R.D. at 376-80 (1996) (discussing the Eisen rule).
193. See Hazard, supra note 14, at 2. Professor Geoffrey Hazard has correctly characterized
this debate as a contest of heated political rhetoric:
The contending dies often seem to be talking about very different transactions. On
behalf of votaries for claimants, it is asserted that wholesale rip-offs are involved, in
which defendants have unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of unprotected
ordinary citizens. On behalf of defendants, it is alleged that the class suit itself is
blackmail. Of course, much of this talk is simply the shield-banging media rhetoric that
has become all too customary an accompaniment to litigation involving high stakes.
Id.
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backdrop of this considerable Eisen kerfuffle, scholars have converged
on the thesis that Eisen does not present a jurisprudential bar to meritbased considerations during the class certification process.194
For example, Professor Geoffrey Hazard has proposed that the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules ought to consider procedures for
determining the merits of individual claims and the size of the class
before the suit is certified as a class suit. ―The basic idea,‖ he writes, ―is
to reverse the decision in Eisen v. Carlyle & Jacquelin and to provide for
an initial judgment on the merits of class members in relation to the
claims.‖195 Moreover, Professor Hazard has noted that ―there is nothing
inherent in a class suit that would prevent a determination of merits of
some of the claims before addressing the problem of class certification;‖
that is, that the Eisen decision presents no such obstacle.196
Professor Hazard‘s proposal entails amendments to Rule 23 that
would permit a court conditionally to certify a class, conduct pretrial
discovery with respect to the scope and scale of a limited subset of
typical claims, and try those claims to establish typical values. If the
plaintiff prevailed, the court would revoke the conditional certification
and certify the entire class; if the defendant prevailed, the court would
decertify the class.197
Professors Robert G. Bone and David S. Evans have proposed a
root-and-branch approach to the Eisen doctrine, suggesting that it ought
to be abolished.198 These commentators suggest that courts should
assess the class certification requirements (for numerosity, commonality,
typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority)199 based on
evidence, including a merits-evaluation of the certification requirements
and a showing of likelihood of success on the merits of each
requirement.200 This approach is preferable, its authors argue, to courts
attempting to screen deficient merits-based class litigation through strict
pleading standards or penalties for frivolous filings.201
The Bone-Evans proposal to require judges to conduct a meritsbased analysis of class certification requirements is based on cost-benefit
policy rationales:
194. Cf. Bone & Evans, supra note 14, at 1251 (urging abolition of the Eisen rule).
195. Hazard, supra note 14, at 4.
196. Id. at 9.
197. Id. at 4-6.
198. Bone & Evans, supra note 14, at 1264-76.
199. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).
200. Bone & Evans, supra note 14, at 1327-30. They characterize their proposal as ―modest.‖
Id. at 1327.
201. Id. at 1328.
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Rule 23 calls for a ―rigorous analysis‖ of each class certification
requirement. Moreover, as we have seen, some of those requirements,
such as commonality, typicality, predominance and superiority, call on
the court to predict the likely litigation path of the lawsuit, and this
kind of prediction often requires an evaluation of the strength of the
issues on the facts of the case. The Eisen rule, in effect, imposes an
independent constraint on the scope of the certification inquiry in the
name of avoiding prejudice, maintaining procedural purity, reducing
errors, and conserving litigation resources. Such a constraint might be
an acceptable gloss on Rule 23 if its purported benefits were clear and
substantial enough. But they are not.
Our policy arguments also have broader implications. The error-andprocess-cost analysis supports our more ambitious proposal that judges
conduct a merits review as part of every certification decision
regardless of whether merits-related issues are directly relevant to a
certification requirement. Limited precertification discovery would be
allowed on all the salient issues in the case, and the trial judge would
make and justify a determination whether class members‘ substantive
claims have a significant likelihood of success. The merits inquiry
need not be elaborate or extensive. The goal would be to avoid
certifying class actions when the class claims are all substantively
frivolous or extremely weak. 202

Professor Geoffrey P. Miller is the third prominent academic to
contribute to the merits-based class certification debate,203 and he too has
endorsed some version of a merits-based inquiry at class certification.204
In parsing the Eisen decision, Professor Miller has contributed a useful
schema of Eisen interpretations that courts have applied in construing
this problematic decision. Thus, Professor Miller explains that some
courts pursuant to Eisen have adopted ―strong-form‖ rules that prohibit
the court from inquiring into the merits of the claims and require courts
instead to accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.205
Other courts have adopted ―weak-form‖ rules that permit a court to
make reasonable inquiries into the merits relevant to class certification
requirements.206 In a third variation, a few courts have adopted ―superweak‖ rules that either permit or require a court to evaluate the class‘s
likelihood of success in the litigation.207

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 1327-28.
See generally Miller, supra note 14, at 51.
Id. at 84-87.
Id. at 55-59.
Id. at 59-62.
Id. at 62.
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Professor Miller argues that both strong-form and super-weak form
rules have little foundation in the law and are not supported by the Eisen
decision.208 Professor Miller instead endorses the weak-form merits
rule, which he states is ―easy to justify under existing law.‖ A court that
applies the weak-form rule ―is simply engaged in the normal and
expected judicial task of marshalling relevant evidence and applying law
to facts. In fact, any reasonable interpretation of Rule 23 mandates a
weak-form rule, since the framers of the rule must have intended to
equip trial courts with the resources to make an informed and reasoned
decision.‖209
Similar to other academic commentators, Professor Miller supports
his merits-based rule preference based on relevant underlying social
policy rationales: the intersection of merits evaluation with preclusion
doctrine, the effects of merits evaluation on the relative settlement
posture of plaintiffs and defendants, and judicial economy concerns. In
these arenas, Professor Miller argues that the weak-form merits rule
comports with preclusion concerns (the problem of one-way
intervention),210 and ―offer a better mix of settlement effects than either
of the alternatives.‖211 Regarding judicial efficiency, Professor Miller
concedes that the efficiency of weak-form merits rule is more
ambiguous, because weak-form rules are more burdensome at the front
end of litigation than strong-form rules. Nonetheless, Miller concludes
that:
Preliminary inquiries under a weak-form rule might have the
efficiency-enhancing effects to the extent that they focus the trial
court‘s attention on the case at any early point in the litigation and
induce better trial and pretrial management. Preliminary merits rulings
under weak-form rules may also facilitate earlier settlements . . . . 212

Finally, Professor David Rosenberg and Randy J. Kozel have
suggested one of the most interesting merits-evaluation proposals.213
These commentators have proposed that courts engage in mandatory
summary judgment adjudication on class claims as a pre-requisite to
final approval of any settlement agreement.214 The authors view the
mandatory summary judgment process as a means to overcome the
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
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nuisance-settlement problem in class action litigation.215 According to
Kozel and Rosenberg, some percentage of meritless class litigation is
nonetheless pursued because ―paying off the proponent of the meritless
claim or defense rather than incurring the greater expense of litigating to
have it dismissed may well be the opponent‘s rational (and expected)
course of action.‖216
Again, social policy rationales are offered in support of the
mandatory summary judgment model. Nuisance class action suits, it is
argued, ―decrease social welfare by vexing and taxing the victimized
party, encouraging misallocation of legal resources, and diminishing
public confidence in the civil liability system.‖217 Moreover, the
prospect of nuisance settlements distorts the incentives of potential
litigants to take socially appropriate levels of precaution against risk.
Therefore, ―mandating summary judgment as a condition precedent to
entering into an enforceable settlement agreement eliminates the
potential payoff from nuisance-value strategies, removing any incentive
to employ them.‖218
The authors‘ model for mandatory summary judgment, they
explain, is simple. Class claims would have to be submitted for merits
review on summary judgment as the precondition for the parties to enter
into an enforceable class settlement.219 This procedure, they contend,
would not add significant costs, as compared to the costs of settling nonnuisance class actions.220 The mandatory summary judgment model,
however, contemplates that such a merits-based review would occur
after class certification, rather than prior to class certification.221 Kozel
and Rosenberg contend that pre-certification merits review provides
minimal advantages that are ―overshadowed by prohibitive costs.‖222
Therefore, these commentators argue that mandatory summary

215. Id. at 1850. ―The civil justice system is rife with situations in which the difference in cost
between filing and ousting meritless claims or defenses makes the nuisance-value strategy
profitable.‖ Id. at 1851.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1852.
218. Id. at 1853.
219. Id. at 1861-62.
220. Id. at 1871-72. This is because, the authors contend, current standards for judicial
approval of class settlements entail far more extensive expenditures and substantive analyses to
evaluate the merits of the class claims, relative to the showing that would be required for mandatory
summary judgment.
221. Id. at 1890-93.
222. Id. at 1893-94; 1896-1901.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss4/5

38

Mullenix: Dropping the Spear
10_MULLENIX_WESTERN

2010]

11/9/2010 1:15 PM

DROPPING THE SPEAR

1235

judgment, if fully effective, is far more efficient than pre-certification
merits review as a means of preventing nuisance-value claims.223
Collectively, academic commentary by influential scholars within
the last decade manifests a trend towards endorsing some sort of merits
review during the class certification process.224 These proposals share
common ground in the fundamental policy reasons supporting such
merits-based scrutiny of class claims. This academic commentary is
consistent and convergent with the growing trends in federal decisional
law that requires more specificity and plausibility in pleading and more
rigorous analysis of class certification motions. While varying in detail
and degree, the academic proposals urge courts to assess the underlying
merits of class claims, or class certification requirements, during the
process of certifying a class action. Somewhat separately, Kozel and
Rosenberg would require a regime of mandatory summary judgment
adjudication after class certification but prior to settlement authorization.
Hence, the academic universe has moved a considerable distance
from eschewing merits-based evaluations in the class action context.
But, having conceptually embraced the thesis that some merits
evaluation in complex litigation is appropriate―if not necessary―the
most logical, efficient, and fair approach is to require summary judgment
adjudication prior to class certification on the individual plaintiff‘s
claims. All current proposals are wrongheaded in this: merits-evaluation
during the class certification comes too late to avoid substantial
transaction costs, judicial inefficiency, and fairness concerns.
In a post-Hydrogen Peroxide world,225 the class certification
process has become increasingly burdensome and costly under
heightened ―rigorous analysis‖ requirements. Thus, proceeding with the
class certification process entails massive transaction costs involved with
pre-certification discovery and motion practice.
Pre-certification summary judgment adjudication, in effect, avoids
the class certification process altogether if the defendant prevails on the
motion and the plaintiff has filed a legally and factually insufficient
complaint. Assuming that a plaintiff‘s complaint survives a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the availability of pre-certification summary
judgment permits discovery limited to the named plaintiff‘s
claim―which constitutes a cabined investigation and a contained cost.

223. Id. at 1892-93.
224. See id. at 1891 (―Though its validity as a purely judicial creation remains questionable in
the federal system, PCMR [pre-certification merits review] has been gaining support in recent years
from influential commentators and federal appellate courts alike.‖) (citing authorities and cases).
225. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
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If the plaintiff‘s claims cannot withstand a summary adjudication, the
plaintiff should not be able to gain an aggregation advantage by allowing
class certification without a ruling on the summary judgment motion. It
is simply unfair and inefficient to postpone merits evaluation until the
class certification hearing or some other post-certification opportunity
(such as a precondition to settlement authorization).
D.

The Pre-Certification Discovery Debate

A rule requiring pre-certification summary judgment adjudication
in advance of class certification also ameliorates problems relating to the
nature and scope of pre-certification discovery. The extent to which
parties to a class action litigation should be able to gain access to
discovery prior to class certification, as well as the scope of that
discovery, has become a heated and controversial debate.
Generally, prior to the class certification decision, plaintiffs seek
expansive general discovery into the class claims,226 including discovery
relating to the merits of the class claims.227 Defendants, on the contrary,
seek to cabin discovery as much as possible―to limit the ability of
plaintiffs to conduct a fishing expedition into the defendants‘ records
and practices. Defendants also seek to cabin discovery because of the
substantial transaction costs involved in responding to plaintiff‘s
expansive merits-based discovery requests. Hence, most defendants
seek to limit pre-certification discovery only to information relating to
satisfaction of class certification requirements, rather than wholesale
merits discovery on class members‘ claims.228
Courts have taken different approaches to authorizing or limiting
discovery before the class certification motion. There is some authority
for the proposition that if it is evident from the nature of the claims
pleaded and applicable law that the record is adequate for a court to
decide whether a class may be certified, a court may decline to order
pre-certification discovery to either party.229 In the post-Hydrogen-

226. See, e.g., American Nurses‘ Ass‘n v. Illinois, 1986 WL 10382, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(plaintiffs seek general discovery on merits issues underlying employment discrimination claims).
227. Id.
228. Id.; See, e.g., Borskey v. Medtronics, Inc., 1998 WL 122602, at *3 (E.D. La. 1998)
(―Therefore, before the Court fully releases the hounds of discovery to flush out the entire spectrum
of possible plaintiffs, the Court finds it prudent to focus the spotlight on those criteria that the
named plaintiffs allegedly possess.‖).
229. See, e.g., Fogie v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1398 (D. Minn. 1993). Accord, THE
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH, supra note 8, at §21.14 (―A threshold question is
whether precertification discovery is needed. Discovery may not be necessary when claims for
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Peroxide230 class certification era, it seems increasingly unlikely that
many courts will certify class actions based on the facial sufficiency of
the pleadings alone.
In most class action litigation, the question whether a proposed
class action is suitable for certification is a contested issue. Hence, when
the facts relevant to class certification are disputed, or when the party
opposing class certification contends that the claims or defenses raise
individualized issues, most courts recognize that some discovery may be
necessary.231 The nature and scope of permissible discovery prior to
class certification typically is contended by the parties.
In this situation, courts often bifurcate discovery between
certification issues and merits issues underlying the class allegations,232
in order to balance the competing needs of and burdens on the parties.233
However, a judicial order bifurcating discovery often leads to contention
among the parties concerning the characterization of discovery requests;
in many instances, it is not always clear what information has bearing on
class certification issues only, as opposed to underlying merits concerns.
The Federal Judicial Center and federal courts have recognized that there
is not always a bright line between discovery limited to certification
issues only, and merits discovery on the underlying claims.234
Moreover, the Judicial Center has suggested that some pre-certification
discovery into the merits of the claims is generally more appropriate for
complex cases that are likely to continue even if the litigation is not
certified as a class action.235
relief rest on readily available and undisputed facts or raise only issues of law (such as a challenge
to the legality of a statute or regulation.)‖).
230. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
231. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH, supra note 8, at §21.14. It is generally
improper for a court to dismiss a proposed class action, without any precertification discovery, if the
pleadings do not conclusively establish that the Rule 23 requirements are met. See Walker v. World
Tire Corp., 563 F.2d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1977).
232. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH, supra note 8.
233. See, e.g., Nat‘l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 88 F.R.D. 272 (D. Conn.
1980) (balancing the needs of plaintiffs and defendants for precertification discovery, and limiting
discovery of both parties).
234. Id.
235. Id.
Allowing some merits discovery during the precertification period is generally more
appropriate for cases that are large and likely to continue even if not certified. On the
other hand, in cases that are unlikely to continue if not certified, discovery into aspects of
the merits unrelated to certification delays the certification decision and can create
extraordinary and unnecessary expense and burden. If merits discovery is stayed during
the precertification period, the judge should provide for lifting the stay after deciding the
certification motion.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH, supra note 8.
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Requiring a court to evaluate and adjudicate pre-certification
summary judgment motions effectively would address the related
problem of permissible pre-certification discovery. In this regard, the
prevailing approach―that recommends bifurcation of discovery between
class certification evidence and merits evidence―has it backwards. This
approach is inefficient, contentious, and often difficult to apply. Thus,
rather than limiting pre-certification discovery to information related to
the satisfaction of class certification requirements, pre-certification
discovery should be limited to merits discovery of the plaintiff‘s claims
that is necessary to support or oppose a summary judgment motion.
Limiting discovery to the underlying merits of the plaintiff‘s claims
prior to class certification satisfies various social policy goals. It is both
efficient and fair. First, cabining merits discovery prior to class
certification limits the exposure of both parties to the substantial
transaction costs entailed in wholesale discovery of class claims. If a
plaintiff‘s complaint is legally and factually deficient, there is scant
justification to expose a defendant to wholesale class-wide merits
discovery before class certification.
Further, if the defendant prevails on the pre-certification summary
judgment motion, limited merits discovery prior to class certification
eliminates the transaction costs entailed in certification discovery, as
well as the related costs of litigating the class certification motion.
Limiting discovery to the merits of the plaintiff‘s claims, for the
purposes of a summary judgment motion, also avoids the contentious
debates concerning what discovery requests relate to certification issues
only, and what discovery requests bear on underlying merits issues.
Limited merits discovery prior to class certification also benefits
the named plaintiffs. To the extent that a plaintiff may have lacked
factual or evidentiary support for his or her claims at the time of filing
the class complaint, limited merits discovery prior to class certification
permits the plaintiff to develop its case and to avoid summary judgment
dismissal. Indeed, such limited merits discovery―provided the plaintiff
has legally and factually viable claims―may enhance the class litigation
itself if the plaintiff is able to withstand the defendant‘s summary
judgment motion prior to class certification. Without regard to the
suitability of the action to class certification, a prevailing plaintiff that
withstands pre-certification summary judgment has the advantage of
learning that a court believes the action is viable enough to proceed to
trial.
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IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN MDL PROCEEDINGS
A.

The Non-Class Action Aggregation Movement

This article has largely focused on the role of summary judgment,
prior to class certification, as a means for efficiently and fairly
adjudicating complex litigation. Although class action litigation
undoubtedly will remain a procedural fixture for resolving large-scale
disputes, other non-class aggregation methods for addressing complex
litigation exist and may become a primary means for resolving such
cases. Thus, the Federal Judicial Center has studied the expanding role
of multidistrict consolidation in federal civil litigation,236 and it has
documented an increasing trend among federal courts to utilize this
procedural mechanism.237
The multidistrict litigation statute provides for the transfer of cases
from various federal district courts to a single, designated MDL court,
for consolidated and coordinated pre-trial proceedings.238 The FJC has
documented an increasing trend of the Panel of Multidistrict Litigation
to grant MDL status to major litigation and to order MDL transfers.239
The FJC study has found that the Panel is more likely to order MDL
transfer if the proceeding includes class allegations.240 In addition, the
study finds that a substantial percentage of class action litigation
transferred under MDL auspices is terminated during the MDL pretrial
process.241
In analyzing this trend towards increased use of MDL proceedings,
the FJC has concluded that this trend partially is the result of the
increased difficulty in obtaining class certification, especially in mass
236. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (the ―Multidistrict Litigation‖ statute; otherwise known as MDL
proceedings). See generally, Symposium, The Problem of Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2199 (2008).
237. See Emery G. Lee, Margaret Williams, Richard A. Nagareda, Joe S. Cecil, Thomas E.
Willging, & Kevin M. Scott, The Expanding Role of Multidistrict Consolidation in Federal Civil
Litigation (Draft paper, Federal Judicial Center 2009); see also Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of
Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883
(2001) (documenting increasing numbers of MDL proceedings).
238. See supra note 237.
239. Lee, Williams, Nagareda, Cecil, Willging, & Scott, supra note 237, at 2, 9.
240. Id. at 2-3, 9-10.
The study found that the MDL panel is more likely to order MDL transfer in proceedings
raising claims relating to air disasters, antitrust, intellectual property, and securities
issues. The study also found that the overwhelming majority of MDL cases were
products liability cases, and that asbestos cases made up a substantial part of the whole.
Id. at 2-3.
241. Id. at 24.
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tort litigation.242 Hence, MDL proceedings have become a surrogate
means for aggregating litigation and at the same time avoiding the rigors
(and possible rejection) of the class action rule. Thus, the FJC has
concluded:
Details aside, the big-picture emerges: Courts are very unlikely to
certify class actions for the litigation of mass torts. Still, the practical
need to avoid duplicative discovery and other inefficiencies of pretrial
litigation remains for the parties on both sides, counsel, and the courts.
The observed inclination toward a higher grant rate for MDL motions
in products liability cases thus can be understood as a partial substitute
for litigation inefficiencies now unavailable via class certification.
From the standpoint of defendants, MDL transfer makes for greater
efficiencies in pretrial process without the additional pressure to settle
that arises from the increased variance in the potential outcome
associated with class certification.243

Whether defendants prefer MDL transfer and consolidated
proceedings―because these proceedings avert the settlement pressure
concomitant with potential class certification―remains an open question
and is an inquiry outside the scope of this article. One might be
skeptical of this proposition, however, because class certification is
available in MDL proceedings, thereby diluting the theory that MDL
proceedings circumvent the class action rule in some way.244
For the purposes of this discussion, however, attention should be
paid to MDL forum proceedings, assuming there is a documented trend
towards resolving complex litigation under MDL auspices. If this is
true, then the locus of inquiry should be on the role of pre-trial motions
in MDL proceedings as a means to resolve complex litigation (parallel to
the role of dispositive pre-certification motions in class action litigation).
If some substantial percentage of MDL litigation involves class action
litigation, then the argument for pre-certification summary adjudication
is the same for MDL proceedings.
Defendants should, in appropriate MDL cases, seek summary
judgment of the named plaintiffs‘ claims, and MDL judges should
resolve such motions prior to deciding a class certification motion.

242. Id. at 21.
243. Id.
244. Having suggested that MDL proceedings are both desirable and favorable to defendants
because these proceedings are a surrogate for class action litigation, the FJC study nonetheless notes
a high correlation between grants of MDL motions and the presence of a request for class
certification. The FJC study suggests that ―the connection between MDL treatment and requests for
class certification also reflects other practical effects that bear close attention.‖ Id. at 22.
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Concededly, resolving summary judgment motions may become
complicated where an MDL proceeding has consolidated multiple,
competing class actions. Nonetheless, summary judgment prior to a class
certification decision is an efficient and fair means for resolving
complex litigation in an MDL proceeding, just as it would be in a single
district court proceeding. The form of the proceeding (MDL) ought not
to alter the soundness of the principle that summary adjudication of an
individual plaintiff‘s claim ought to precede class certification.
B.

Dispositive Motion in MDL Procedure

Finally, it should be noted that MDL judges clearly have the power
to rule on dispositive motions to dismiss and on motions for summary
judgment.245 The FJC has noted that the MDL process effectively
centralizes the application of various means for pretrial scrutiny.246
Hence, the FJC has suggested that: ―Interpretation and application of the
Twombly pleading standard, the Court‘s summary judgment trilogy, and
the Daubert admissibility standard understandably are not identical
across the federal system. MDL treatment for pretrial proceedings,
however, effectively operates to lend a unitary yardstick for the making
of such rulings.‖247
Thus, whether complex litigation is pursued under class action
auspices in a single federal court or through a consolidated MDL
proceeding, litigants are authorized to pursue dispositive motions and
judges are authorized to resolve such motions. The desirability of such
procedure seems manifest; the only question concerns the extent to
which judges ought to be required to rule on such motions. This article
urges that the federal rules make explicit a requirement that federal
judges evaluate and rule on summary judgment prior to creating a large,
aggregate litigation, either through class certification or through some
other non-class aggregate procedure.
V. CONCLUSION
More than fifteen years ago, proponents suggested an amendment
to Rule 23 that specifically would have given federal judges discretion to
rule on dispositive Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions prior to class
245. See David F. Herr, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL: PRACTICE BEFORE THE
JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION § 9:21 (2009) (citing cases); see also Lee, et al.,
The Expanding Role of Multidistrict Consolidation, supra note 237, at 26 n.98.
246. Lee, Williams, Nagareda, Cecil, Willging, & Scott, supra note 237, at 26.
247. Id.
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certification.248 In the firestorm of heated emotions surrounding the
Amchem249 and Ortiz250 settlement classes―then working their way
through the federal appellate system―this proposed amendment was
abandoned along with many other Rule 23 proposed amendments. The
proposal for pre-certification review of dispositive motions was attacked
as an illegitimate incursion on the Eisen doctrine; the plaintiffs‘ bar
especially viewed this proposal as constituting a prohibited judicial
venture into assessing the merits of claims in the class action context.
That was then, and this is now. In hindsight, the proposed
amendment relating to pre-certification dispositive motions seems
entirely innocuous; the proposal was not mandatory and merely would
have given judges explicit authorization to decide pre-certification
dispositive motions, where Rule 23 does not on its face provide such
judicial guidance. Moreover, the Eisen argument seems entirely to be a
red herring. Judicial consideration of pre-certification dispositive
motions on the named class representative‘s claims have nothing at all to
do with the Eisen rule, and any number of federal courts have
consistently pointed this out.
As this article has suggested, codifying a provision that explicitly
authorizes federal judges to rule on pre-certification summary judgment
motions has a great deal to recommend it. Such a provision would be
congruent with and parallel to trends in heightened pleading and
heightened class certification requirements, as well as commentary by
influential legal scholars that merits examination in the class action
context is not only permissible, but desirable. As is true of most rule
amendments, promulgating a provision with regard to pre-certification
dispositive motions―at this point―would consist of little more than
codification of existing practice. Many federal courts, it seems, have
abandoned any historical resistance to reviewing and granting precertification dispositive motions.
The need for a rule amendment now is essentially the same as in the
early 1990s, when advocates first suggested this proposal. Although
judges already have discretion to rule on dispositive motions prior to
class certification, many do not exercise this discretion. Admittedly, we
do not have good empirical evidence―actually, any empirical
evidence―concerning why judges decline to rule on pre-certification
dispositive motions. Some judges, at least, are chary to rule on

248. See supra note 22.
249. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
250. 157 Cal. App. 4th 604.
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dispositive motions in absence of clear authorization in Rule 23. Other
judges may eschew ruling on pre-certification dispositive motions based
on some pre-conceived notion that a court must rule on class
certification prior to ruling on any dispositive motions. Some judges
may decline ruling on pre-certification motions in the misguided or
mistaken belief that such procedure is prohibited by the Eisen rule.
Finally, some judges may defer ruling on a pre-certification summary
judgment rule, based on the historical premise that complex cases are
almost never suitable for summary judgment disposition.
A rule amendment specifically authorizing consideration of precertification dispositive motions would provide federal judges with a
rule-based text upon which to proceed. A weak-form version of such an
amendment would replicate the discretionary language in the 1993 and
1995 proposals; a strong-form version of such an amendment would
require judges to rule on dispositive motions and not defer consideration
until after class certification. The Advisory Committee Note to this
provision could indicate that the provision was a codification of existing
law, that pre-certification consideration of dispositive motions did not
violate the Eisen rule, and that best practices entailed deciding precertification motions in a timely fashion. A provision authorizing or
mandating judicial ruling on pre-certification dispositive motions could
be located either in Rule 23, Rule 12, Rule 56, or in some combination
of the rules.
The focus of this article and proposal has been on pre-certification
summary judgment practice, rather than the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. Critics of the Court‘s Twombly251 decision have suggested that
the plausibility pleading standard visits a harsh and unfair consequence
on plaintiffs, prior to discovery. In a similar vein, critics of the
Hydrogen Peroxide252 line of cases, requiring heightened proof to satisfy
the rigorous analysis test for class certification, have assailed this
ratcheting-up of the class certification standards, with its concomitant
cost and expense.
Enhanced summary judgment practice prior to class certification,
then, represents an intermediate position between dismissing a case as
facially deficient on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but avoiding the transaction
costs and fairness concerns associated with meeting the heightened class
certification requirements for class certification. In focusing pretrial
practice on summary judgment, this provides more leniency at the

251. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
252. 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
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pleading threshold, but it affords plaintiffs the opportunity for limited
merits discovery on the pre-certification summary judgment motion. As
explained above, pre-certification summary judgment practice, with
discovery limited to the merits of the plaintiff‘s individual claims, strikes
a sensible and fair accommodation to the pre-certification discovery
dilemma.
However, it should be noted that this proposal for enhanced
summary judgment prior to class certification might require differential
or more careful application, depending on the substantive nature of the
type of class litigation pursued. The need for a ruling on summary
judgment prior to class certification may be most compelling in Rule
23(b)(3) damage class action context. On the other hand, summary
judgment before class certification might be less compelling in the
context of Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive or declaratory class actions, where
the remedy is classwide. Similarly, certain types of class actions ― such
as antitrust or Title VII pattern-and-practice class actions ― that depend
on inherently classwide proof, also might not be suitable for precertification summary judgment adjudication.
Finally, the case for enhanced pre-certification summary judgment
practice entails modification of the still-prevailing mindset that summary
judgment is not suitable in complex cases. This proposition seems illconceived and outmoded; complexity itself provides no basis for a free
pass to class certification or settlement. Given the realities of modern
class litigation and the substantial costs, expenses, and judicial resources
involved in resolving such litigation, the informal presumption ought to
be the reverse of the historical view. Hence, complex litigation ought to
be viewed as especially suitable for summary judgment adjudication,
given the size and complexity of the stakes involved.
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